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British Impeachments (1376- 1787)  
and the Preservation of the American 
Constitutional Order 
by FRANK O. BOWMAN, III* 
Introduction: Why British Impeachments Matter 
Impeachment is a British invention, employed by Parliament beginning 
in 1376 to resist the general tendency of the monarchy to absolutism and to 
counter particularly obnoxious royal policies by removing the ministers who 
implemented them.  The invention crossed the Atlantic with the British 
colonists who would one day rebel against their mother country and create 
an independent United States of America. 
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the delegates decided 
that presidents and other federal officers could be impeached, but they 
recoiled from the severe and occasionally fatal punishments imposed by 
Parliament, and they wrestled over what conduct should be impeachable.  
Early in their deliberations they resolved that the sole punishment for 
impeachment would be removal from office and in some cases 
disqualification from future office-holding.1  But defining the nature of 
impeachable offenses proved more troublesome.  Various formulations were 
advanced.  As the convention rounded into the home stretch, the phrase that 
had taken hold was “treason or bribery.”2  George Mason objected because 
 
        *   Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law at the University of Missouri 
School of Law.  I am immensely grateful for the work of my research assistants, Sam Crosby and 
Taylor Payne, and for the indefatigable support of the good folks at the University of Missouri Law 
Library, in particular its director Randy Diamond and librarian Cynthia Shearrer.  Many of the ideas 
discussed in this article first appeared in FRANK O. BOWMAN, III,  HIGH CRIMES & 
MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP (2019).  Longer extracts 
reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §  3. 
 2.  In July 1787, the delegates twice voted in favor of the general proposition that the 
president should be removable for “malpractice or neglect of duty.”  2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 61, 69, 116 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS, 
VOL. 2].  Many delegates endorsed impeachment of presidents and other federal officials for a body 
of offenses outside the common law crimes, using terms such as “maladministration,” “corrupt 
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he thought “treason or bribery” far too narrow.  Mason was a student of 
British impeachment and had authored the post-revolutionary impeachment 
provisions of the Virginia state constitution.3  He wanted a federal 
impeachment remedy analogous to British practice, at least in the conduct it 
covered, even if not in the sorts of brutal punishments Parliament could 
impose.4 
“Treason,” Mason said, “will not reach many great and dangerous 
offences.  Hastings is not guilty of treason.”5  He was referring to the 
impeachment trial of Warren Hastings, Governor-General of India, just 
about to start in England.6  Mason wanted American impeachments to reach 
beyond the two indictable crimes of treason and bribery to important 
breaches of public trust in both the domestic and foreign sphere, the kinds of 
offenses charged against Hastings, and as we will see, against many other 
British officials over the preceding four centuries. 
Mason’s solution was to add the word “maladministration” after 
“bribery.”  But James Madison rose to object, saying, “[s]o vague a term will 
be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate.”7  Mason thought the 
matter over and came back with a compromise.  Omit “maladministration” 
but add to treason and bribery “other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”8  The 
new language passed eight states to three.9 
Mason’s choice of “high crimes and misdemeanors” was not whimsical.  
Rather, he lifted it from centuries of British practice in which Parliament 
increasingly (though not invariably) used this phrase to describe conduct it 
charged as impeachable.  As a result, one of the perennial arguments in 
American impeachments is over whether the Framers intended “high crimes 
 
administration,” “neglect of duty,” and “misconduct in office.”  Id. at 64–69.  On August 20, 1787, 
the Committee on Detail reported to the convention that federal officers “shall be liable to 
impeachment and removal from office for neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption.”  Id. at 337. 
In its report of September 4, 1787, the Committee of Eleven proposed that the President be 
removable only on conviction of “treason or bribery.”  Id. at 495. 
 3.  PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 
65–66 (1984). 
 4.  Though not the focus of this Article, it is fair to say that the indispensable innovation of 
America’s adaptation of impeachment to the sphere of representative democracy was not in the 
definition of impeachable conduct, but in the limitation of the consequence of impeachment to 
removal from office. 
 5.  FARRAND, RECORDS, VOL. 2, supra note 2, at 550. 
 6.  See infra, notes 200–604, and accompanying text. 
 7.  FARRAND, RECORDS, VOL. 2, supra note 2, at 550. 
 8.  Id.  Mason’s original formulation was “other high crimes and misdemeanors against the 
State.”  Id.  The phrase “against the State” was later amended to “against the United States,” id. at 
551, and then deleted altogether by the Committee on Style in the final draft of the Constitution. 
 9.  Id. 
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and misdemeanors” as a term of art limiting impeachable conduct to only 
those misdeeds impeached by Parliament prior to 1787.10 
My study of both British and American impeachments convinces me 
that “high crimes and misdemeanors” do not limit the Congressional 
impeachment power to the particular, and with the passing years increasingly 
antique, list of transgressions Parliament had addressed by 1787.11  Both 
Parliament and the Framers were acutely conscious that the sorts of 
dangerous public misconduct for which impeachment is a necessary remedy 
could not easily be described in advance.  Therefore, even as an original 
matter, the adoption of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” invites 
an elastic application of the impeachment remedy tailored to the needs and 
circumstances of the political era in which it is invoked.  The appeal of a 
more expansive reading is even greater if one leans toward the “living 
constitution” view of our founding charter.  However, the argument of this 
Article does not depend on resolving either the debate over originalism as an 
interpretive method or the question of whether the Framers intended “high 
crimes and misdemeanors” to be a narrowly restrictive term of art.  Because 
even if one takes the most restrictive view of the phrase, one that absolutely 
prohibits to Americans impeachment for any sort of conduct not addressed 
by British parliamentary precedents, the Framers’ choice of “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” nonetheless sets a baseline minimum for the scope of 
American impeachments.  In other words, even if one accepts both a strict 
originalist approach to American constitutional interpretation and that the 
Framers meant to confine American impeachment within the boundaries set 
 
 10.  For example, Raoul Berger famously argued that the phrase was a “technical term” 
derived from British practice, with which the Framers would have been familiar, and therefore that 
its technical meaning “furnishes the boundary of the [impeachment] power.”  RAOUL BERGER, 
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 71, 86–87 (1973).  See also, HOFFER & HULL, 
supra note 3, at 266–70 (arguing that the American understanding of impeachable offenses 
essentially incorporates the British understanding).  I think that British impeachment precedents 
are central to understanding the Framers’ ideas about impeachment—hence, this article—but I have 
also long thought that one can overstate the case.  Frank O. Bowman, III, “High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors”: Defining the Constitutional Limits on Presidential Impeachment, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1517, 1525 (1999).  As this Article demonstrates, the British did not always use the phrase 
“high crimes and misdemeanors” to define impeachable offenses, and as scholars since Berger have 
amply demonstrated, see HOFFER & HULL, supra note 3, at 1–106, by 1787, Americans had 
developed a body of colonial and state impeachment precedent derivative of, but not identical to, 
British practice.  As noted in the text, I think it is right to say that British impeachment precedents 
create a baseline minimum for the reach of the term “high crimes and misdemeanors.”  The 
argument about how much further the term may properly reach is one for another day and need not 
be resolved for the purposes of this Article. 
 11.  This argument is developed at length in my forthcoming book, FRANK O. BOWMAN, III,  
HIGH CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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by British practice, that means American officials are properly impeachable 
for at least the range of conduct covered by British practice. 
Therefore, at a moment when impeachment talk is rampant, a 
reexamination of British impeachments up to 1787 is in order.  The subject 
is hardly novel.  Every political generation confronted with a major 
impeachment crisis has trawled parliamentary records for guidance or grist 
for partisan argument.  But comprehensive examinations of the whole sweep 
of British impeachment practice are rare.12  And almost all treatments of the 
subject tend, understandably, to focus on the issues and types of conduct 
peculiar to the contemporary controversy that moved their composition.  
This Article examines the entire arc of British impeachments from 1376 to 
1787, with particular attention to issues raised by the current presidency. 
The Article concludes that, although British impeachment employed 
many of the forms of a criminal trial and could produce dire personal 
punishments of the sort we associate with criminal law, it was, first, last, and 
always, a political tool in the larger sense.  Parliament invented and 
periodically resorted to impeachment as a means of resisting particular 
objectionable policies of the crown or its ministers, but even more 
fundamentally as a mechanism for bending the kingdom’s basic 
constitutional order away from absolutism and toward representative 
government.  This is a critical point.  The most recent American 
impeachment battle, the tawdry inquiry into Bill Clinton’s extramarital 
sexual dalliances and his desperate efforts to hide them, finally turned on the 
question of whether such low and degraded matters amounted to “high 
crimes.”  It transformed the most august tribunal of American democracy 
into a sort of constitutional police court, obsessed with oral sex, the meaning 
of “is,” and the technicalities of perjury statutes.13  One effect of the Clinton 
debacle was to condition the current generation of citizens and scholars to 
discuss impeachment in terms of the minutiae of whether some presidential 
action offends the letter of this or that statute.14  A study of the long run of 
 
 12.  The last reasonably comprehensive American treatment of the subject was in Raoul’s 
1973 classic, BERGER, supra note 10, at 7–78, but Berger spends an inordinate amount of time 
addressing the question of what he calls “retrospective treasons,” to the detriment of consideration 
of other issues that I confess to thinking more germane to present circumstances.  Perhaps the most 
comprehensive, if dated, American treatment is ALEXANDER SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON 
FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 150–51 (1916).  See also, H. LOWELL BROWN, HIGH CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS IN PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 13–29 (2010) (touching some important high 
points of British impeachment history). 
 13.  See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Falling Out of Love With America: The Clinton 
Impeachment and the Madisonian Constitution, 59 MD. L. REV. 5 (2001). 
 14.  See, e.g., the debate over whether the June 16, 2016, Trump Tower meeting between 
Donald Trump, Jr. and other figures in the Trump presidential campaign and some Russian persons 
may have constituted a violation of federal election laws, summarized in Frank O. Bowman, III, 
The Russian Lawyer Meetings and Election Law Crimes: The Experts Weigh In, IMPEACHABLE 
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British impeachments reminds us that, like any other legal mechanism, 
impeachment will sometimes be employed for petty or ignoble purposes, but 
it was invented as a mighty weapon against executive tyranny and a powerful 
tool for preservation of the constitution.  Thus, the “high” transgressions that 
should most readily provoke impeachment may not be indictable crimes, or 
even discrete incidents of technical misconduct, but policies or patterns of 
behavior destructive of the constitutional order. 
That said, the legalistic form of impeachment—the specification of 
offenses by the lower legislative house in articles of impeachment followed 
by a trial of those offenses in the upper house—mandates an inquiry into the 
particular types or categories of misbehavior that Great Britain’s Parliament 
found impeachable.  Even when Parliament expressly alleged that the 
behavior of the accused endangered the constitution, the Commons laid out 
the particulars and the Lords put them to their proof.  Thus, over the 
centuries, Parliament developed a body of precedent that roughly defined 
and loosely cabined its impeachment power.  To the extent that the Framers 
incorporated British precedent into their model of American impeachment, 
knowing what Parliament embraced as impeachable conduct helps us set the 
parameters for impeachment under the United States Constitution. 
In sum, Parliament found the following categories of conduct 
impeachable: (1) treason, particularly of the crude sort that involved armed 
rebellion, plotting against the monarch’s life, or aiding avowed foreign 
enemies in war, but also including a good deal of much more subtly 
subversive behavior (arguments over the proper reach of treason consumed 
much parliamentary energy); (2) ordinary criminality, such as false 
imprisonment, rape, or murder; (3) corruption, which might consist of 
indictable behavior like outright bribery or extortion, but just as often 
involved misuses of office for private gain that were not strictly criminal, but 
were nonetheless understood to drain the public purse or subvert public 
confidence in government to an intolerable degree; (4) incompetence, 
neglect of duty, or maladministration in office; (5) betrayal of the nation’s 
foreign policy interests, sometimes characterized as treason, but always 
based on a determination that a minister had engaged in behavior (with or 
without the monarch’s sanction) directly at odds with Parliament’s view of 
the nation’s fundamental interests; and (6) as noted, subversion of the 
constitution and laws of the realm. 
 
OFFENSES? BLOG (July 13, 2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/13/the-russian-lawyer-
meeting-and-election-law-crimes-the-experts-weigh-in/. 
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I.  The Origins of Impeachment 
Ever since human beings first formed hierarchical societies they have 
wrestled with the problem of how to displace powerful people who 
misbehave.  In absolute monarchies (or personal dictatorships), the solution 
is simple.  An absolute ruler’s subordinates remain in office at his pleasure 
and are removed, and perhaps punished, when he is sufficiently displeased.  
The monarch himself can only be displaced by palace coup, national 
revolution, or external invasion, with all the bloodshed and general 
inconvenience those remedies imply. 
The problem becomes more complicated once political and economic 
power is dispersed among competing centers of authority.  A monarch whose 
continued reign depends in some measure on the support of powerful 
hereditary nobles can no longer be quite so arbitrary in his treatment of those 
who hold positions of authority under him, many of whom will be those 
nobles or members of their families.  As a result, the nobility gains a voice 
in the selection and removal of officials who may please the ruler but 
displease the nobility.  The more centers of power develop external to the 
monarchy—land-holding lesser gentry, clergy, merchants, bankers, 
professional lawyers and judges—the more complicated the problem of 
removal of the powerful becomes.  The challenge lies not merely in 
determining who will have authority to remove an official, but also in the 
questions of whether removal should be accompanied by additional 
punishment and what process should be employed in judging each case. 
Great Britain began contending with these challenges very early in its 
history.  Magna Carta, now hailed as the Great Charter of English liberties, 
was actually a peace treaty between King John and his rebellious barons 
signed in 1215.15  Most of it dealt with issues of no modern relevance, such 
as special kinds of rents and taxes called scutage and socage and placement 
of fish weirs in the River Thames.16  But several clauses addressed the issue 
of removal and punishment of officials and persons of rank.  The barons 
wanted protection from royal arbitrariness.  Accordingly, multiple 
provisions of Magna Carta protect the nobility and “free men”17 generally 
 
 15.  JAMES C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 13–14 (3d ed. 2015).  
 16.  Id.  See also WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 343–44 (2d ed. 1914).  
 17.  The class of “free men” was smaller than might be supposed because it excluded those 
bound to service, the unfree peasantry or “villeins.”  THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 507–08 (4th ed. 1948) [hereinafter PLUCKNETT, CONCISE 
HISTORY]; T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
177–83 (1960) [hereinafter PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD]. 
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from punishment, including fines18 and loss of lands or status, except by “the 
lawful judgment of his equals.”19  But the barons also wanted to get rid of 
some of King John’s retainers, so the king agreed in Magna Carta itself to 
turn out of office all the kinsmen and followers of a fellow named Gerard de 
Athée.20  This result was no doubt pleasing to enemies of de Athée, but the 
episode was entirely unsatisfactory as a model for how to deal with 
troublesome royal officials.  A system that requires strapping on your 
chainmail and rallying the rest of the barons for a rebellion anytime you 
disapprove of the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Keeper of the Privy 
Seal is tiresome in the last degree. 
In the centuries following Magna Carta, the national governing body 
we know as Parliament evolved in fits and starts from ad hoc assemblies of 
notables such as Simon de Montfort’s parliament of 126521 into a bicameral 
legislature consisting of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.  
From the earliest times, the relations between Parliament and the crown were 
marked by two persistent and cross-cutting themes.  On the one hand, the 
great subjects of the realm were determined to influence the selection, and 
removal, of royal ministers.22  On the other hand, those same great subjects 
sought to ensure that, should they take office under the crown, something 
akin to due process stood between themselves and removal, ruin, and 
possibly death, whether at the whim of a capricious monarch or at the hands 
of the crown’s adversaries.23 
For a good many years, the king could convict and sentence traitors and 
other malefactors “by record,” meaning that he simply recounted what he 
believed to be the prisoner’s misdeeds and a quasi-judicial body of noblemen 
or common law judges, or perhaps the king himself, would then pronounce 
judgment based on what the king had said.24  But in time it came to be 
accepted that all criminal proceedings, including those against officials, 
 
 18.  Magna Carta, clause 21, provides that “[e]arls and barons shall be fined only by their 
equals, and in proportion to the gravity of their offence.”  English translation of Magna Carta, 
BRITISH LIBRARY (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-
translation. 
 19.  Id. at cls. 39, 52. 
 20.  English translation of Magna Carta, supra note 18, at cls. 50.  For a discussion of why 
the barons so disliked Athée, see MARGARET CAROLINE RICKABY, GIRARD D’ATHEE AND THE 
MEN FROM THE TOURAINE: THEIR ROLES UNDER KING JOHN (2011), http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/901/. 
 21.  S.T. Ambler, Magna Carta: Its Confirmation at Simon de Montfort’s Parliament of 1265, 
130 ENG. HISTORICAL REV. 801 (2015). 
 22.  D.A. CARPENTER, THE MINORITY OF HENRY III 407–12 (1990) (discussing the 
determination of upper nobility to influence the choice of royal ministers). 
 23.  T.F.T. Plucknett, The Origin of Impeachment, 24 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL 
HISTORICAL SOC’Y 47, 48 (1942) [hereinafter Plucknett, Origin]. 
 24.  Id. at 56–58. 
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should be initiated in legal form and tried by a juridical body separate from 
the crown.  In cases involving persons of rank, the mandate of Magna Carta 
that judgment should be imposed only by a body of one’s equals meshed 
with the natural inclinations of the notables who made up Parliament to 
confer jurisdiction in such matters on Parliament itself.25  This innovation 
ensured that the king could not easily strike against high-placed enemies 
without the assent (however coerced or grudging) of Parliament.  In due 
course, it also evolved into a weapon Parliament could employ against royal 
officers or policies of which it disapproved. 
One might wonder how parliamentary pursuit of the king’s men would 
be thought an effective means of altering the king’s policy.  The short answer 
lies in the modern catchphrase, “Personnel is policy,” which recognizes that 
implementation even of clear directives from an energetic ruler will fail 
absent loyal, forceful, competent subordinates.  But an absolute and 
hereditary monarchy presents particular problems for the would-be reformer 
because neither the monarch nor his subordinates are subject to 
institutionalized limitation or control.  In the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, Parliament gained increased formal authority over lawmaking and 
the monarch’s sources of revenue.26  Nonetheless, a king resolutely 
determined to pursue his own courses despite parliamentary opposition had 
considerable power to do so and, the monarchy being hereditary, he could 
not be removed absent a genuine revolution.  Therefore, parliaments 
displeased by a king’s policies, but unwilling to go so far as open rebellion, 
indulged the fiction that the king was not at fault, but was being misled by 
incompetent or malicious royal ministers.27  Parliament found it could hobble 
unpopular royal policies by removing the minister charged with carrying 
them out without disrupting the continuity of royal rule.  If the most effective 
executants of a king’s policy are removed from the political board, the king’s 
policy will be crippled.  If the king’s ministers know that pursuit of the king’s 
policies in defiance of the will of Parliament presents a real risk of removal 
from office and additional painful punishments, their enthusiasm for 
implementing the king’s will is likely to be sensibly diminished. 
Another constant thread in the long debate over parliamentary 
condemnation of erring officials was concern over retrospective 
 
 25.  T.F.T. Plucknett, State Trials Under Richard II, 2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL 
HISTORICAL SOC’Y 159, 159 (1952) (noting that by the reign of Richard II (1377-1399), “[t]he 
principle had . . . been accepted that parliament was the proper jurisdiction for the trial of eminent 
or official persons who were accused of misconducting public affairs”).   
 26.  See, e.g., PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 184–93. 
 27.  For a relatively modern expression of this sentiment, see the speech of the Duke of Argyl 
during the debate in the House of Lords on the motion of Lord Carteret for the removal of Sir 
Robert Walpole, 11 T.C. HANSARD, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1098–101 
(1812). 
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punishments.  Insofar as Parliament merely acted as the forum in which 
nobles or servants of the crown were charged and tried for conduct that had 
previously been defined by statute or common law as illegal, the process 
presented no conceptual novelty.  The principal matters requiring resolution 
were the roles to be performed by each house, the degree and forms of due 
process to be afforded the defendants, and the appropriate remedies in the 
event of conviction.  Most of these questions could be resolved by analogy 
to legal procedures already employed in regular courts.  But cases of the 
great and powerful presented a special problem arising from two interlocking 
features. 
First, the misconduct alleged in these cases did not always violate a pre-
existing law.  For example, in 1388, Michael De la Pole, the Earl of Suffolk, 
and others were charged with “high treason” for, in effect, taking advantage 
of their privileged access to young King Richard II to persuade the king to 
adopt bad policies and to confer a variety of titles and favors on themselves.28  
Allegations of this sort had never previously been denominated treason.29  
Nonetheless, in a monarchy, the behavior charged against Suffolk—the 
king’s favorites distorting national policy and grabbing wealth and power—
is precisely the kind of thing vigilant parliamentarians will be alert to 
prevent.  So it is not surprising that Parliament chose to treat it as treason in 
Suffolk’s case.  Moreover, because it will often be difficult to predict, still 
less to define in advance, the sorts of misbehavior, incompetence, or outright 
knavery that should properly produce scrutiny and perhaps removal of 
government officials, there was a natural disposition to keep the scope of 
chargeable conduct indeterminate. 
Second, for centuries, the possible penalties for losing a state trial were 
not limited to removal from office, but included crippling fines, forfeiture of 
lands and titles, imprisonment, and death (sometimes preceded by the 
prolonged agony of being hanged, drawn, and quartered).30  In short, these 
were criminal cases, at least in the sense that the punishments were of the 
sort otherwise reserved for the most serious criminal offenses.  During the 
 
 28.  T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH 
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 
1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS VOL. 1 91–112 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL. 
I].  Suffolk was first impeached in 1386 by the House of Commons and convicted by the House of 
Lords on a set of charges not apparently denominated as treason.  Id. at 90–91.  The impeachment 
removed Suffolk from office.  Id.  Later, in 1388, a set of “appeals” (in essence, criminal charges) 
alleging treason were filed by certain lords in the House of Lords.  Suffolk was convicted, but by 
that time had prudently decamped to France.  Id. at 97–98. 
 29.  BERGER, supra note 10, at 2.  
 30.  PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 194–95, 418–19, 675 (describing 
varieties of forfeitures as punishment for treason and in cases of attainder).  The penalty of drawing 
and quartering for treason was only abolished by the Forfeiture Act of 1870.  A.B. KEITH, RIDGES’ 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ENGLAND 412 (6th ed. 1937). 
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medieval and early Renaissance periods, the severity (and occasional 
finality) of punishments imposed upon those convicted in state trials was 
scarcely surprising.  The losers of political struggles in those eras rarely 
retired to the country to write their memoirs, but were distressingly apt to 
respond by arranging a coup, assassination, or insurrection.31  Accordingly, 
simple prudence on the part of the winners of these contests dictated that 
those convicted of state crimes should be disabled from creating future 
mischief through imprisonment, exile, impoverishment, or death. 
Nonetheless, a central principle of the evolving British common law of 
crimes, expressed in the Latin phrase nulla poena sine lege, was that people 
should not be punished except for violation of pre-existing law.32  Therefore, 
British impeachment was always plagued by tension between the suspect 
legitimacy of retrospective punishment and that pragmatic realization that 
misconduct by public officials may subvert the proper functioning of 
government and represent a danger to the state without being criminal or 
indeed violating any existing law.  So long as parliamentary trials produced 
not only purges from office, but severe personal punishment, the process 
bore a taint of fundamental unfairness. 
II.  The First British Impeachments 
The term “impeachment” as a description of one mode of conducting a 
state trial in Parliament made its appearance in the 1300s.  Scholars of the 
period speak of proceedings against notables accused of public misconduct 
being initiated using various procedural vehicles: indictment, appeal of 
felony, original writ, or even public clamor expressed in the House of 
Commons.33  It seems to be broadly agreed that the first true “impeachments” 
occurred in 1376, during the reign of Edward III in what was known as “the 
Good Parliament.”34 
 
 31.  See generally J.M. ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF EUROPE, 106–238 (1996). 
 32.  Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it 
was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law: he had 
therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of 
consequence be cruel and unjust.  All laws should be therefore made to commence 
in futuro, and be notified before their commencement. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOK 46 (15th 
ed. 1809). 
 33.  T.F.T. Plucknett, The Impeachments of 1376, 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL 
HISTORICAL SOC’Y 153, 154 (1951) [hereinafter Plucknett, Impeachments of 1376]; 1 W.S. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 378 (3d ed. 1931) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, VOL. I]. 
 34.  Id. at 380; PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 164; Plucknett, Origin, 
supra note 23, at 69; JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND, VOL. 1, 148–49 (1883); KEITH, supra note 30, at 215. 
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These first impeachments set the paradigm for later parliamentary 
actions against unpopular ministers.  At the end of Edward’s fifty-year reign, 
when both the old King and his eldest son, Edward, known as the Black 
Prince, were ailing, critics of some of the King’s favorites moved against 
them.  The opposition’s targets included the royal chamberlain, Lord 
Latimer, the Steward of the Household, Lord Neville, as well as Richard 
Lyons, William Ellis, and John Peake.35  The charges brought against them, 
to which we will return momentarily, were various, but the distinctive feature 
of the process is that each case was initiated by a formal accusation by the 
House of Commons followed by a trial in the House of Lords.36 
Even though these “impeachments” were directed at men who had long 
enjoyed the favor of the King, the notables in opposition were at pains to 
avoid the appearance of defying or undermining the authority of the crown.  
During the impeachments of Lord Latimer and Richard Lyons, the Commons 
specifically sought and obtained the sick King’s approval to proceed in the 
first instance and at several points thereafter.37  And the charges were 
carefully framed to avoid casting blame on the crown, alleging instead that 
the defendants had in effect deceived the king and misused his delegated 
authority.  Among the charges against Latimer was that he had “notoriously 
accroached royal power.”38  Likewise, parliament did not proceed to 
judgment until receiving assurance that the king was effectively abandoning 
his former courtiers.  Lyons was condemned only after several of the lords 
testified that the king had disavowed Lyons’ claim to have been acting on 
the authority of the king and his council.39 
There are two other points of interest for us in these first ancestral 
impeachments.  First, as is true down to the present day in American practice, 
the lower house not only framed the charges for the upper house, but acted 
as prosecutors or “managers” in presenting the case for trial.40  Second, while 
a good many of the charges against those impeached in 1376 involved 
corruption of varieties that might have been contrary to some preexisting 
law, some of the allegations charged no apparent crime.  For example, Lord 
Latimer was impeached in part for his failure as a military leader to hold the 
English-occupied French towns of Bécherel and St. Saveur.41 
 
 35.  STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 149. 
 36.  See generally Plucknett, Impeachments of 1376, supra note 33. 
 37.  Id. at 156–57, 162. 
 38.  Id. at 160. 
 39.  Id. at 163. 
 40.  Id. at 164. 
 41.  Plucknett, Impeachments of 1376, supra note 33, at 158. 
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After Edward III died, he was succeeded in 1377 by his grandson, 
Richard II, then only ten years old.42  In the early years of his reign, there 
were ongoing disputes between the favorites and ministers of the young king 
and an opposition party well-represented in Parliament.43  The details are 
unimportant here.  The key developments were that the lords and notables in 
Parliament used the instrument of impeachment to remove several of 
Richard’s advisors, but when Richard gained political strength thereafter, he 
attempted to seize royal control over the impeachment mechanism. 
In 1386, the Commons brought charges in the form of impeachment 
against Richard’s Chancellor, Michael de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk.44  Three 
of the charges alleged garden variety corruption—purchasing crown 
property at a discount or appropriating to himself revenues that ought to have 
gone to the crown45—but several alleged simple incompetence or 
misconduct in office.  Article 3 charged that Suffolk had failed to use 
parliamentary appropriations for maritime defense to good effect, and 
Article 7 alleged that Suffolk had bungled the military expedition to relieve 
Ghent.46  The Lords convicted Suffolk on some of the charges and, after great 
pressure was placed on the King, Suffolk was removed from office and 
imprisoned pending payment of a fine or ransom.47 
Not content with the impeachment and removal of Suffolk, the 
opposition magnates forced Richard to accept a “commission of reform” 
consisting of fourteen nobles with wide powers to set government policy.48  
Unsurprisingly, Richard acceded only grudgingly and began working to 
reverse these encroachments on his authority.  Among his moves in this 
direction was a formal set of inquiries directed to the judges of England in 
1387, in one of which he asked whether, as a matter of law, his ministers 
could be impeached without his consent.  The judges, perhaps under 
considerable royal pressure, said Parliament had no such power.49 
 
 42.  NIGEL SAUL, RICHARD II 12, 24 (1997). 
 43.  SIMON SCHAMA, A HISTORY OF BRITAIN: AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD? 3500 B.C. 1603 
A.D. 244–45 (2000); WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING 
PEOPLES: THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 372–81 (1956). 
 44.  HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 90–94. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 94; N.B. Lewis, Article VII of the Impeachment of Michael de la Pole in 1386, 42 
ENG. HISTORICAL REV. 402, 402 (1927). 
 47.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 170–71. 
 48.  CHURCHILL, supra note 43, at 379. 
 49.  Id. at 171–72; see also Stanley B. Chrimes, Richard II’s Questions to the Judges, 1387, 
72 L. Q. R. 365, 370 (1956); T.F.T. Plucknett, Impeachments and Attainder, 3 TRANSACTIONS OF 
THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOC’Y 145, 145 (1953) [hereinafter Plucknett, Impeachments and 
Attainder]. 
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The Lords struck back in 1388 by bringing charges of treason against 
Suffolk and other supporters of the King using the mechanism of the 
“appeal.”50  An appeal differed from impeachment in that it was a 
conventional means of bringing a criminal charge in which an aggrieved 
party formally accused the wrongdoer and became in effect a private 
prosecutor.51  In Suffolk’s case, five lords, known to British history as “the 
Lords appellant,” made their charges of treason directly in the House of 
Lords, with no participation by the Commons.52  Not only did the House of 
Lords convict Suffolk and his allies, but it then proceeded to impeach and 
banish the judges who had previously declared that Parliament lacked the 
power to impeach without the king’s assent.53  In due course, however, the 
King slowly regained power relative to dissident members of the nobility.  In 
1397-1398, Richard and his political allies used a combination of appeals 
and impeachments to charge various of his opponents with treason and other 
offenses. 54  Several were executed, murdered, or died in prison; others were 
banished.55  In the course of these proceedings, Richard was careful to 
reclaim the right of royal assent to impeachment proceedings.56  However, 
his reassertion of authority did not last long.  He was deposed by Henry 
Bolingbroke in 1399 and died in captivity in early 1400.57 
There were no impeachments in the half-century following the death of 
Richard II.58  However, in 1450, William de la Pole, grandson of the Michael 
de la Pole impeached in 1386 and also bearing the title Earl of Suffolk, was 
impeached by the House of Commons for various supposed offenses 
connected to his negotiation of King Henry VI’s marriage to the French 
noblewoman, Margaret of Anjou.59  Before Suffolk could be tried in the 
House of Lords, Henry sought to save him from serious punishment by 
 
 50.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 172–73; Matthew Steilen, Bills of 
Attainder, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 767, 777 (2016). 
 51.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 309 (1769). 
 52.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 172–73. 
 53.  Id. at 173; Plucknett, Impeachments and Attainder, supra note 49, at 146–47. 
 54.  The Dukes of Gloucester and the Earls of Warwick and Arundel were charged by appeal.   
Plucknett, Impeachments and Attainder, supra note 49, at 149.  Sir Thomas Mortimer and Sir John 
Cobham were impeached.  Id. at 151–52.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 
175–76.  See HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 33, at 125. 
 55.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 175–76. 
 56.  Plucknett, Impeachment and Attainder, supra note 49, at 153. 
 57.  Anthony Tuck, Richard II (1367–1400), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NAT’L BIOGRAPHY 
(2009), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780 
198614128-e-23499. 
 58.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 194. 
 59.  Id. at 194; HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 272–73. 
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banishing him on his own authority.60  The king’s evasive maneuver did 
Suffolk no good because the ship taking him into exile was captured in the 
English Channel by brigands, who beheaded him on the side of a longboat.61  
The important point for us in Suffolk’s downfall is that it represented a 
resurrection of Parliament’s claim of power to impeach ministers against the 
wishes of the crown. 
Parliament may have reasserted its theoretical power to remove 
troublesome ministers, but the power then lay dormant in practice for a 
century and a half until the reign of James I in the first quarter of the 
seventeenth century.  Historians provide various explanations for the 
interruption, but the basic one seems to have been the weakness of 
Parliament relative to the crown during this period.62  Parliament was active 
in the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547), but primarily as an instrument of the 
king’s will on projects like the reformation of the English church.63  During 
Elizabeth I’s forty-five year reign (1558-1603), she called parliaments about 
every five years, but the body was only in session for a total of three years 
while she was on the throne.64  Throughout the Tudor period, ministers, high 
clergy, noblemen, and others were cast out of office and some severely 
punished or even executed, but these falls from grace were driven primarily 
by the wishes of the monarch.65  In any case, as a procedural matter, the 
crown chose not to reassert control over the impeachment mechanism, but to 
employ other vehicles for condemning its enemies and erring servants, most 
notably for our purposes the bill of attainder. 
III.  Bills of Attainder 
A brief explanation of bills of attainder is in order here.  Bills of 
attainder differed from impeachments in several key respects.  An 
impeachment has the form of a judicial proceeding.  Formal charges are 
composed and approved by the lower legislative house and its 
representatives act as prosecutors before the upper house, presenting 
evidence in support of the charges.  The upper house then acts as judges 
passing on the question of whether the charges have been proven.66  By 
contrast, a bill of attainder is a legislative act, meaning that the subject of the 
 
 60.  HOWELL, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 274–76. 
 61.  Id. at 275–76. 
 62.  See, e.g., STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 158. 
 63.  MAURICE ASHLEY, CHARLES I AND OLIVER CROMWELL: A STUDY IN CONTRASTS AND 
COMPARISONS 141 (1987). 
 64.  Id. at 141–42. 
 65.  See generally J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII (1968); DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, 
THOMAS CRANMER (1996); ELIZABETH JENKINS, ELIZABETH THE GREAT (1958). 
 66.  BERGER, supra note 10, at 57; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at 256–57. 
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bill can be condemned without any violation of law, or even clearly 
articulable wrong, having been charged or proven.67  The bill passes through 
Parliament like any other, with no necessary provision for those accused to 
defend themselves.68  Punishments could be severe, including execution, 
imprisonment, exile, ruinous fines, and forfeiture of lands and titles.69  Bills 
of attainder were often associated with “corruption of blood,” which not only 
stripped the offender of his property and titles, but barred his heirs from 
inheriting.70 
During the Wars of the Roses (1455-1487),71 the warring Yorkist and 
Lancastrian factions used bills of attainder rather than impeachments or 
appeals to oust and eliminate their opponents.72  The heyday of attainders 
arrived in the reign of Henry VIII, during which 130 regime opponents were 
attainted and thirty-four executed.73  Notable victims included Thomas 
Cromwell74 and the king’s fifth wife, Catharine Howard.75  Notoriously, 
Henry secured from the judges of England a declaration that, although it 
would be bad form, an accused could be attainted by Parliament and 
executed without any opportunity to be heard in his own defense.76  It was 
also common to pass bills of attainder posthumously to provide legal 
justification for seizures or forfeitures of property or disinheritance of heirs.77 
Bills of attainder were a very rough business.  Not only did they produce 
draconian punishments that could extend beyond the lifetime of the offender, 
 
 67.  KEITH, supra note 30, at 216 (“Attainder served as a means of proceeding against a person 
when no real charge could be substantiated.”); PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, 
at 232–34.  But see BERGER, supra note 10, at 29 (asserting that an attainder “is only by courtesy 
labelled ‘legislative,’ for it is a judgment of individual guilt in everything but name”); see generally 
Steilen, supra note 50 (arguing that bills of attainder should be considered forms of summary legal 
process, rather than legislative acts). 
 68.  Steilen, supra note 50, at 793. 
 69.  J.R. Lander, I. Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453–1509 4 HISTORICAL J. 119, 119 (2009), 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/i-attainder-and-forfeiture-
1453-to-15091/1EA8D0EFB954878797B941400045B969. 
 70.  Alison Reppy, The Slayer’s Bounty: History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 
N.Y.U. L. Q. 229, 233 (1942). 
 71.  See generally DAVID GRUMMITT, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WARS OF THE ROSES 
(2013). 
 72.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. I, supra note 33, at 381; PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra 
note 17, at 233; KEITH, supra note 30, at 216–17. 
 73.  Stanford E. Lemberg, Parliamentary Attainder in the Reign of Henry VIII, 18 
HISTORICAL J. 675, 681 (1975). 
 74.  Lemberg, supra note 73, at 692–94. 
 75.  Id. at 694–97. 
 76.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 233; EDWARD COKE, THE 
FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION 
OF COURTS 37 (1644). 
 77.  Steilen, supra note 50, at 821–22. 
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but their availability as a means of circumventing even the outward forms of 
legal process for those in bad odor with the dominant power in the state ran 
contrary to the evolving British dedication to fair procedures. Bills of 
attainder were not a feature of colonial America, there being no parliament 
in North America and no occasion for the British parliament to attaint 
colonists, at least until the American Revolution, after which the issue was 
moot.  However, in the immediate aftermath of American independence, 
several state governments did enact bills of attainder or their substantial 
equivalents against unrepentant royalists.78  These enactments were highly 
controversial at the time, in part because attainders had garnered such ill 
fame in British history.  The U.S. constitution banned bills of attainder and 
ex post facto laws in Article I, Section 9.79 
IV.  Impeachment in the Era of the Stuart Kings 
In Great Britain, impeachment reemerged from its long dormancy 
during the reigns of the Stuart kings—King James I (1603-1625), his son 
Charles I (1625-1649), and his grandson Charles II (1649-1651, 1660-1685).  
The uses of impeachment in this tumultuous period are an important key to 
the American founders’ understanding of the mechanism.  The Stuart era was 
not that far in the historical past for the delegates to the Philadelphia 
Convention and their contemporaries.  It was only as far behind them as the 
period from the American Civil War to the First World War is for us.  
Moreover, the conflicts between the Stuarts and Parliament helped define the 
ideas of eighteenth century Britons, whether in the home islands or their 
colonies, about proper constitutional relations between an executive and a 
legislature. 
James Stuart was the son of Mary, Queen of Scots, and a great-great-
grandson of King Henry VII of England.80  He became King James VI of 
Scotland in 1567 when he was barely a year old, after Queen Elizabeth I 
forced his mother to abdicate in his favor.81  When Elizabeth died childless 
in 1603, he succeeded her as James I of England and Ireland, thus placing 
England, Scotland, and Ireland under one monarch.82  During the twenty-two 
years in which he wore the three crowns of the newly consolidated kingdom, 
he seems to have been a tolerably good ruler,83 leaving among other legacies 
 
 78.  Id. at 880–89 (describing post-war events in Pennsylvania). 
 79.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”). 
 80.  PAULINE CROFT, KING JAMES 11 (2003). 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE NEW 
WORLD 147–48 (1956). 
 83.  CROFT, supra note 80, at 6. 
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the English translation of the Bible we know as the King James Version.84  
Critically for our purposes, James’ accession to the British crown coincided 
with the launch of the English project of settling the east coast of North 
America.  In 1607, the first permanent English colony in the New World set 
up shop in Virginia (so-called after Elizabeth I, the Virgin Queen) and 
christened itself Jamestown, in honor of the reigning monarch.85  From that 
moment until the new United States declared independence from the parent 
country in 1776, the histories and collective consciousness of Great Britain 
and its children across the Atlantic were intimately intertwined. 
James I believed firmly in the divine right of kings, a governmental 
theory he articulated in two learned works, The True Law of Free 
Monarchies86 and the Basilikon Doron87  James’ theory of kingship claimed 
not only heavenly sanction for monarchical rule, but also espoused royal 
absolutism.88  Parliaments, in particular, he viewed as nothing more than 
advisors to be consulted or ignored as the ruler deemed best.  The authority 
upon which law itself rested, in James’ view, was the royal will and not any 
legislative assembly.89  In The True Law, he wrote: 
 
The kings, therefore, in Scotland were before any estates or ranks 
of men, before any parliaments were holden, or laws made, and 
by them was the land distributed, which at first was wholly theirs.  
And so it follows of necessity that kings were the authors and 
makers of the laws, and not the laws of the kings.90 
 
True to his convictions, James ruled for long periods without convening 
Parliament; however, he could not raise the funds necessary to support his 
 
 84.  See generally DAVID NORTON, A TEXTUAL HISTORY OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE (2005). 
 85.  SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 44–45 
(1965).  See generally CHARLES E. HATCH, JR. THE FIRST SEVENTEEN YEARS: VIRGINIA 1607-
1624 (1957). 
 86.  KING JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES: OR THE RECIPROCAL AND 
MUTUAL DUTY BETWIXT A FREE KING AND HIS NATURAL SUBJECTS (Daniel Fischlin & Mark 
Fortier eds., 1616) [hereinafter THE TRUE LAW].  The work was first published in Scotland 1598 
and later in England upon James’ accession to the English throne. 
 87.  KING JAMES I, THE BASILIKON DORON OF KING JAMES VI (1603).  The True Law was a 
treatise, possibly written to counteract emerging contractarian theories of government.  The 
Basilikon was a sort of ruler’s manual addressed to James’ eldest son Henry and, after Henry’s 
premature death, passed on to his second son Charles, who followed James as next king of England.  
ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 21. 
 88.  6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 11–12 (2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter 
HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI]. 
 89.  Id. at 20–23, 71; CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, CHARLES I 100–01 (1968). 
 90.  KING JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF FREE MONARCHIES: AND, BASILIKON DORON 69 
(Daniel Fischlin & Mark Fortier eds., 1996). 
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sometimes extravagant court and pay for various military ventures without 
occasionally turning to that body.91  For their part, the notables, grandees, 
and propertied men of middle station who made up Parliament were 
concerned about royal finance, foreign policy, and religion.92  They were 
determined that the King’s spendthrift tendencies not be financed from their 
purses.93  They were at times more bellicose, particularly towards Catholic 
Spain, than the King.94  And the majority were devoutly Protestant and 
deeply suspicious of any real or perceived tendency toward backsliding into 
papism. 
The religious conflicts of the age are of some importance to 
understanding tensions between James I, his son Charles I, and their 
Parliaments.  Since Henry VIII’s divorce from his first wife in 1533 and the 
separation of the Church of England from Rome-centered Catholicism, 
England had become firmly Protestant, or at least severed from the Church 
of Rome.95  However, the transition was turbulent.  Henry’s methods were 
not gentle and stirred considerable, if fruitless, resentment.96  From 1553–
1558, Henry’s daughter Queen Mary I tried bloodily, but unsuccessfully, to 
reverse the English Reformation.97  Queen Elizabeth reaffirmed the 
Protestant character of the Church, but during her long reign, adherents of 
the old faith remained numerous and hopeful, even among the aristocracy.98  
James I, as a Scot, was himself a Protestant, but he was seen by some as 
distressingly tolerant of Catholics and he openly sought alliance with 
Catholic Spain through the marriage of his son Charles to a Spanish 
princess.99 
Moreover, the spirit of the Protestant Reformation was always at least 
somewhat at odds with a theory of divinely sanctioned absolute royal rule of 
the sort espoused by James.100  Kings as God’s instruments made certain 
sense so long as those kings ruled under the sanction of a universal Catholic 
Church.  But wherever the concept of a faith based on scripture accessible to 
all literate persons supplanted salvation through adherence to the rules of the 
 
 91.  CROFT, supra note 80, at 75–81, 93. 
 92.  See, e.g., PETER ACKROYD, 3 THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: CIVIL WAR 6–12, 22–25, 29–
36 (2014). 
 93.  ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 143. 
 94.  ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 144–47. 
 95.  J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 509–16 (1968). 
 96.  Id. at 241–354.  
 97.  EAMON DUFFY, FIRES OF FAITH: CATHOLIC ENGLAND UNDER MARY TUDOR 79 (2009); 
DAVID M. LOADES, MARY TUDOR: A LIFE (1989). 
 98.  JENKINS, supra note 65, at 156–58, 262–63. 
 99.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 43, 65, 68, 73–74, 77. 
 100.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 128. 
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Church of Rome, the foundations of absolute royal rule softened.  If the truth 
was discoverable through inquiry, rather than attainable only by submission 
to authority, then automatic acquiescence in the whims of hereditary rulers 
deserved rethinking.  If the path to God ran, as the Protestants claimed, direct 
from man to his maker and not through ordained intermediaries, then the 
substitution of kingly intermediaries for priestly ones made poor sense. 
At all events, as James I’s reign progressed, tensions between crown 
and parliament increased.  Among the leading parliamentarians was Sir 
Edward Coke, a learned judge and lawyer who believed that the common 
law of England proceeded from ancient sources and, on some fundamental 
points, superseded expressions of royal will.101  This view was not admired 
by the King’s party and in 1616, Coke was dismissed from the bench.102  
Coke’s leading antagonist among supporters of James and the royal 
prerogative was Sir Francis Bacon,103 famous to us as one of the great minds 
of the age.104  In 1618, the King appointed Bacon to be Lord Chancellor of 
England, the highest office of the realm combining executive, judicial, and 
legislative responsibilities.105  Three years later, in 1621, James was obliged 
by extreme financial exigency to call only his third parliament since coming 
to the throne in 1603.106 
The parliamentarians ultimately came through with the supplies James 
required, but they used their leverage to seek reforms of various deficiencies 
of royal government.  Among these were corruption in the system of raising 
funds for the crown by granting royal licenses and monopolies on certain 
kinds of trade,107 and corruption and mismanagement in what were known 
as courts of chancery which operated under the aegis of the Lord Chancellor 
and derived their authority from the royal prerogative rather than the legal 
precedents that governed the common law courts beloved of Lord Coke.108 
 
 101.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 84; 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 428, 430, 453–54 (1931) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, VOL. V]. 
 102.  Damien X. Powell, Why was Sir Francis Bacon Impeached? The Common Lawyers and 
the Chancery Revisited: 1621, 81 HISTORY 511 (1996). 
 103.  Id. at 515–16. 
 104.  See generally BENJAMIN FARRINGTON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS BACON: AN 
ESSAY ON ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM 1603 TO 1609 (1964).  
 105.  Peter Michael Urbach, Anthony M. Quinton, and Kathleen Marguerite Lea, Francis 
Bacon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Francis-Bacon-
Viscount-Saint-Alban (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). 
 106.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 70. 
 107.  See JOHN BOWLE, CHARLES I 58–59 (1975). 
 108.  See infra notes 109–110, and accompanying text.  See also, ROSCOE POUND, 
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 102–04 (1923) (noting long history of opposition by 
Commons to courts of chancery). 
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In March 1621, parliamentary investigators reported that Sir Giles 
Mompesson, who presided over the licensure of inns and held the gold and 
silver thread monopoly, had been up to financial shenanigans.109  At about 
the same time, a parliamentary committee investigating the chancery courts 
discovered that Chancellor Bacon had been accepting generous gifts from 
litigants in cases over which he presided.110  Bacon’s receipt of bribes cannot 
have been a great surprise since litigant payments to judges were a common 
practice of the period, frowned upon by the high-minded, but rarely the 
source of any official rebuke.111  In any case, the House of Commons, to 
what must have been general astonishment, excavated the forgotten 
impeachment mechanism from under a century-and-a-half of dust and used 
it, first, to charge Mompesson with various forms of corruption and abuse of 
authority and later to charge Bacon with multiple counts of bribery.  
Mompesson was convicted and banished, after the King himself came down 
to Parliament to disavow abuses of the royal grants.112  Bacon, perhaps 
assuming that the ordinariness of his infraction would spare him any serious 
punishment, confessed.113  The Lords convicted him, King James was either 
unwilling or unable to save his chief servant, and Bacon was stripped of his 
offices and condemned to relative penury for the rest of his days.114 
Three points emerge from these first impeachments of the Stuart period.  
First, in rediscovering impeachment as a means of removing royal officials 
and ministers, Parliament signaled its awakening from long torpor as a 
serious legislative counterweight to royal authority, or what we would think 
of as the executive branch of government.  Second, impeaching Bacon was 
part of a larger effort to assert the primacy of law over executive branch 
absolutism.  Finally, the convictions of both Mompasson and Bacon struck 
blows against the misuse of government office for self-enrichment.  All three 
themes resonate in the present day. 
At the close of James I’s reign, in 1624, Parliament took another 
ministerial scalp by impeaching the Earl of Middlesex, the Lord High 
 
 109.  THOMAS B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS 
FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO 
THE YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 1119–32 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, 
VOL. II].  Note that the dates in HOWELL, VOL. II are different than those cited in the text.  It appears 
that Howell used the dates noted in the original records, and does not adjust for the official change 
to the Gregorian Calendar which occurred in 1752.  I.M. Kerzhner, Converting Dates from the 
Julian (Old Style) or French Republican (Revolutionary) Calendars to the Gregorian (New Style) 
Calendar, 33 TAXON 410 (1984).  
 110.  HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1086–120. 
 111.  BOWLE, supra note 107, at 59. 
 112.  HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1125–32 
 113.  Id. at 1102–04 
 114.  Id. at 1112–14. 
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Treasurer.  The true reason of Parliament’s enmity may have been the Earl’s 
support for James’ unpopular pro-Spanish foreign policy, but he was 
removed on charges of corruption.115  Though convicted and temporarily 
imprisoned and stripped of his offices, he was quickly pardoned and restored 
to grace after King James died in 1625 and was succeeded by King Charles 
I.116 
Charles I inherited his father’s absolutist view of monarchy with its 
attendant disdain for parliaments.  That alone would have ensured some 
tension between the king and the notables who populated Parliament, but 
Charles seems to have had fewer political gifts than his father117 and he 
assumed the throne in an age increasingly disinclined to unquestioning 
acceptance of claims of authority, whether secular or religious.  Tensions 
between Charles and the parliamentarians eventually produced open warfare, 
the defeat of the royalist forces by Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army, 
Charles’ capture,118 imprisonment, and finally, in 1649, his execution.119  The 
details of the politics of Charles’ turbulent reign are far beyond the scope of 
this discussion.  Instead, we will address only the use of impeachments as a 
tool in the disputes between king and parliament. 
In 1626, only two years after Charles’ accession to the throne, 
Parliament impeached George Villiers, the Duke of Buckingham, who had 
been a favorite, and possible lover, of James I and remained the closest 
confidant of young King Charles I.120  Buckingham, a man of modest origins, 
made his way into royal affection through good looks and considerable 
intelligence and charm.  Once firmly ensconced in royal favor, he wielded 
great personal power and enriched his family and friends liberally with titles, 
property, and valuable royal concessions.121  The rapid rise of a social 
climber like Villiers would have stirred resentment in any case,122 but he was 
rendered still less popular by being associated with the unsuccessful and 
unpopular attempt to marry Charles to the daughter of the Catholic king of 
 
 115.  BOWLE, supra note 107, 79–80; PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 
354. 
 116.  R.H. TAWNEY, BUSINESS AND POLITICS UNDER JAMES I: LIONEL CRANFIELD AS 
MERCHANT AND MINISTER (1958). 
 117.  HOLDSWORTH, Vol. VI, supra note 88, at 17. 
 118.  BOWLE, supra note 107, at 280–81. 
 119.  ASHLEY, supra note 63, at 216. 
 120.  HIBBERT, supra note 89, at 29–32. 
 121.  Id. at 31. 
 122.  BOWLE, supra note 107, at 99–100 (describing some among the older aristocracy 
complaining about “abuse of honor” by arrivistes who gained titles through royal favor or 
purchase). 
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Spain,123 as well as the successful, but also controversial, marriage of Charles 
to the equally Catholic French princess Henrietta Maria.124  A number of 
botched military ventures including a failed naval assault on the port of Cadiz 
in 1625,125 gave Charles’s second parliament an excuse to seek 
Buckingham’s impeachment in 1626. 
King Charles, who adored Buckingham, prevented the matter from 
going to trial in the House of Lords with the simple expedient of dismissing 
Parliament.126  The charges against Buckingham, which the formal articles 
of impeachment labeled “misdemeanors, offences, misprisions, and 
crimes,”127 are nonetheless revealing for our purposes.  They fall into at least 
six categories: first, acquiring a “plurality of offices” that were beyond the 
ability of one man to perform; second, buying, selling, or dispensing royal 
offices and titles for his own benefit or that of his family; third, general 
misappropriation of royal funds concealed by misuse of the king’s personal 
seal (the “privy seal”); fourth, mismanaging his responsibilities as Lord 
Admiral of England and Ireland so that trade diminished and piracy 
increased; fifth, being responsible for the loan of certain English ships to the 
French king to use against Protestant Huguenots at Rochelle; and sixth, 
suggesting that King James take some useless medicines during his final 
illness.128 
Few, if any, of these would have been considered either ordinary crimes 
or treason against the crown.  Unauthorized use of the privy seal, if proven, 
might have fit into either or both categories.  Buying and selling offices may 
under certain circumstances have violated the law, but it was perfectly legal 
in many situations and was at worst a venial offense in those days.129  And 
there is no indication that either James I or Charles I disapproved of 
Buckingham’s activities.  The charges involving naval matters express 
parliamentary outrage on two points—Buckingham’s persistent military 
incompetence or misfortune and Protestant parliamentarians’ suspicion that 
the courts of both James I and Charles I were soft on Catholicism.  But 
neither allegation made out either a crime or treason.  The business about the 
 
 123.  PEREZ ZAGORIN, THE COURT AND THE COUNTRY: THE BEGINNING OF THE ENGLISH 
REVOLUTION 63 (1969). 
 124.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 108–09. 
 125.  BOWLE, supra note 107, at 95–96. 
 126.  Id. at 100. 
 127.  HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1308. 
 128.  Id. at 1307–21. 
 129.  PEREZ ZAGORIN, REBELS AND RULERS 1500–1660: SOCIETIES, STATES AND EARLY 
MODERN REVOLUTION 100 (1982); Douglas W. Allen, Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: 
Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office in Pre-Modern Britain, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORETICAL ECON. 57 (2003), http://www.sfu.ca/~allen/venality.pdf; John Miller, The Potential 
for ‘Absolutism’ in Later Stuart England, 69 HISTORY 187 (1984). 
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medicines was merely a nasty, but almost certainly baseless, insinuation that 
Buckingham had tried to poison the old king. 
In sum, Parliament believed impeachment to be proper for ministers 
who employed the powers of office for self-enrichment, grossly mismanaged 
their governmental responsibilities, or betrayed the fundamental interests of 
the country in dealings with foreign powers.  Buckingham’s impeachment 
has been said to have decisively “negatived Charles I’s contention that not 
only was he personally above the law, but also his ministers acting at his 
orders.”130  But it is not clear that Buckingham’s true offenses were 
violations of law in the conventional sense.  There were instead offenses 
against what the notable personages who made up Parliament perceived to 
be the proper constitutional relationship between themselves and the crown, 
and also against parliamentarians’ ideas of proper national policy. 
Charles managed to forestall further use of impeachments against his 
ministers for the next fourteen years by keeping parliaments infrequent and 
short in duration.131  But in 1640, financial exigencies forced Charles to 
reconvene Parliament and accede to an Act stipulating that it could not be 
dissolved without the consent of its members.132  That body, known as the 
Long Parliament, remained formally in session until 1660 and did not 
dissolve even during the war that dethroned King Charles.133 
When Parliament assembled in September 1640, King Charles was not 
only in financial distress, but was facing armed rebellion by his Scottish 
subjects, political chaos in Ireland, and widespread dissension in England.134  
The leaders of the newly assembled legislature, knowing that the king’s 
situation was desperate, were determined to use their leverage to make 
significant reforms.135  They resolved to reassert parliamentary control over 
taxation and revenue.  Many of them were concerned that the king’s 
dedication to the Protestant religion was suspect and distressed at the 
 
 130.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. I, supra note 28, at 382. 
 131.  Parliaments, 1604-1629 The reigns of James I and Charles, THE HISTORY OF 
PARLIAMENT, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/parliaments/parliaments-1604-
1629 (last visited July 18, 2018); Parliaments, 1640-1660 Civil War, Commonwealth and 
Protectorate, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/ 
parliaments/parliaments-1640-1660 (last visited July 18, 2018).  However, in 1637 Parliament did 
impeach a group of judges for ruling that it was lawful for the King to collect the so-called ship 
money tax without the consent of Parliament.  D.L. Keir, The Case of Ship Money, 52 L.Q. REV. 
546 (1936); T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE 
YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL. III]. 
 132.  BOWLE, supra note 107, at 177–78. 
 133.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 360–61. 
 134.  Craig S. Lerner, Impeachment, Attainder, and a True Constitutional Crisis: Lessons from 
the Strafford Trial, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 2057, 2062 (2002). 
 135.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 112–14, 135–36. 
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aggressive hostility of his ecclesiastical appointees like Archbishop of 
Canterbury William Laud to the religious reform movement we know as 
Puritanism.136  Most fundamentally, the parliamentarians rejected Charles’ 
disposition to personal rule.  In modern terms, their quarrel with Charles was 
a constitutional argument.  Charles believed he was anointed by God to 
govern subject to no lesser authority.137  Parliament viewed the monarch as 
a pillar of the state, to be sure, but also as constrained by the law enacted by 
Parliament in statutes and declared by judges of the common law courts.138 
In their view of the law, the leaders of the Long Parliament were 
intellectual heirs of Sir Edward Coke, who had died in 1634,139 but whose 
influence had if anything grown since his falling-out with James I in 1616.  
Accordingly, they sought to reform the legal system, in particular the 
practices of two special courts, the Court of Star Chamber140 and the Court 
of High Commission,141 which derived their authority from the royal 
prerogative rather than either common or statutory law.  The Court of Star 
Chamber enforced Charles’ proclamations, which it held to have the force of 
law.142  The Court of High Commission was the highest religious court in 
England, but also had wide civil jurisdiction.143  Its powers seem to have 
been wielded particularly aggressively against Puritans and others disposed 
to reform of the established church, a faction increasingly well-represented 
in Parliament. 
The parliamentarians abolished the Courts of Star Chamber and High 
Commission in 1641,144 but recognized that their program also required 
removing or neutering the King’s most powerful ministers and retainers.  
Accordingly, they deployed impeachments liberally in the first three years 
of the Long Parliament, bringing at least twenty sets of charges against more 
 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  C.V. WEDGEWOOD, A COFFIN FOR KING CHARLES 4 (1964). 
 138.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 133–34. 
 139.  See generally CATHARINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE: 1552–1634 (1990). 
 140.  Edward P. Cheyney, The Court of Star Chamber, 18 AM. HISTORY REV. 727, 746–50 
(1913). 
 141.  JOHN SOUTHERDEN BURN, THE HIGH COMMISSION: NOTICES OF THE COURT AND ITS 
PROCEEDINGS (1865), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hx3iig;view=1up;seq=5. 
 142.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 31. 
 143.  See generally BURN, supra note 141. 
 144.  Cheyney, supra note 140, at 750; THE ACT FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE COURT OF STAR 
CHAMBER (1641), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN 
REVOLUTION, 1625-1660, at 176–80 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 1906), http://oll.libertyfund.or 
g/pages/1641-the-act-for-the-abolition-of-the-court-of-star-chamber; THE ACT FOR THE 
ABOLITION OF THE COURT OF HIGH COMMISSION (1641), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625-1660, at 181–83 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 
1906), http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1641-the-act-for-the-abolition-of-the-court-of-high-commission. 
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than thirty individual defendants.145  The impeachments of 1640 and 1641 
are perhaps of most current significance because they struck both at the 
King’s most able retainers and through them at his theory of kingship. 
King Charles’ most forceful and energetic secular official was Thomas 
Wentworth, Earl of Strafford.146  Curiously, before joining the King’s party 
and rising to an earldom, Wentworth had been a member of the House of 
Commons himself, was an active supporter of the 1628 Petition of Right 
(which endeavored to set limits on royal power),147 and had even been 
imprisoned in the Tower of London for refusing to pay the “forced loans” 
Charles used early in his reign to finance his government.148  However, as 
soon the Petition of Right passed Parliament and was (grudgingly) accepted 
by Charles, Wentworth switched sides.149  Once committed to the King’s 
cause, Earl Strafford, née Wentworth, became an ardent defender of the royal 
prerogative and the most effective instrument of Charles’ preferred absolutist 
mode of governance.  In Ireland, where he served as the Lord Deputy 
(essentially the king’s viceroy) beginning in 1633, Strafford was particularly 
aggressive in using prerogative power to sweep away opposition to a 
program of ruthlessly efficient administration.150  Recalled to England in 
1639, Strafford urged the King to adopt the same sorts of unyielding tactics 
that had proven successful in Ireland.151  The English proved less tractable. 
King Charles’ most prominent servant among the churchmen was 
William Laud, consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury and thus head under 
Charles himself of the Church of England.152  Laud was determined to 
regularize religious practice and to stamp out dissenters of a Puritan bent.  
The particulars of his religious project are of less importance than his 
methods because he shared with Strafford authoritarian instincts and disdain 
for any law not founded on the will of the King.  Laud ruthlessly wielded 
prerogative courts like the Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber to 
suppress those he felt to be enemies of true religion or its royal head.153  For 
example, in 1637, William Prynne, John Bastwick, and Henry Burton were 
 
 145.  STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 159. 
 146.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 73–77; C.V. WEDGWOOD, THOMAS 
WENTWORTH FIRST EARL OF STRAFFORD, 1593-1641: A REVALUATION (1961). 
 147.  See Harold Hulme, Opinion in the House of Commons on the Proposal for a Petition of 
Right, 6 May, 1628, L THE ENG. HIST. REV. 302, 302–06 (1935); HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra 
note 88, at 74–75.  
 148.  LERNER, supra note 134, at 2064–65. 
 149.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 139. 
 150.  HUGH F. KEARNEY, STRAFFORD IN IRELAND, 1633-41: A STUDY IN ABSOLUTISM (2d ed. 
1989).  
 151.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 186–87, 192. 
 152.  See generally CHARLES CARLTON, ARCHBISHOP WILLIAM LAUD (1987). 
 153.  Id. at 77–80. 
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all sentenced to have their ears cut off for libeling the Church and its 
bishops.154 
Laud was a regular correspondent with Strafford and the two 
commiserated over the impediment to royal government presented by the 
pestilential common law lawyers and courts.  In 1633, just before becoming 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Laud wrote Wentworth in Ireland and warned 
him not to expect too much assistance from Laud in his new position 
because, “the Church it is so bound up in the forms of the Common Law, 
that it is not possible for me, or for any Man to do that good which he would, 
or is bound to do.”155  In his reply, Strafford expressed his determination that 
the king’s objectives would not be thwarted by the common law courts, 
declaring that he would not rest until he saw his royal “Master’s power and 
greatness set out of wardship and above the exposition of Sir Edward Coke 
and his Year Books.”156  In the ensuing years, both men became, if anything, 
less tolerant of legalistic opposition to their projects and more committed to 
the king’s absolute authority. 
Shortly after Parliament convened in the fall of 1640, the Commons 
impeached Strafford on charges of high treason.  The articles are long, 
detailed, and at times delve into seemingly trivial matters, but they allege 
five general theories: first, that Strafford, through both his advice to the king 
and his personal actions had attempted to “subvert the fundamental laws and 
government of the realms of England and Ireland, and instead thereof, to 
introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical government against law”;157 second, 
that he corruptly enriched himself;158 third, that he colluded with Catholics 
to encourage that religion and to secure Catholic support in his “tyrannical 
designs”;159 fourth, that he mismanaged the unsuccessful military sally 
against the invading Scots in mid-1640;160 and fifth that he had counseled 
the king to bring an Irish army to England to make war on his subjects.161 
 
 154.  BOWLE, supra note 107, at 149–50. 
 155.  Letter from Wm. Laud to Thomas Wentworth, Lord Deputy (Sept. 9, 1633), reprinted in 
GEORGE RADCLIFFE, THE EARL OF STRAFFORD’S LETTERS AND DISPATCHES 111 (1739). 
 156.  G.M. TREVELYAN, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ENGLAND 396 (1956); RICHARD 
BAGWELL, IRELAND UNDER THE STUARTS AND DURING THE INTERREGNUM, VOL. 1 1603-1642, 
at 192 (1909). 
 157.  HOWELL, VOL. III supra note 131, at 1385–86 (noting this is a quote from article one of 
the first summary articles of impeachment levied against Strafford). 
 158.  Id. at 1386.  This is the essence of article three of the first summary articles of 
impeachment, expanded on at length in supplemental articles seemingly filed later, particularly 
articles nine through fourteen.  Id. at 1391–94. 
 159.  Id. at 1386. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  This charge has always been controversial because it turned on interpretation of an 
ambiguous statement by Strafford that could have meant either that the Irish army should be used 
to confront the Scots forced mustered in the north, or that it should be used to suppress dissidents 
BOWMAN_5.6.19 UPDATED FINAL FOR ONLINE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2019  3:58 PM 
Summer 2019]     PRESERVATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 771 
Note that these articles include two types of charges prominent in 
Buckingham’s case and other earlier impeachments—abuse of office for 
self-enrichment and mismanagement of government or military affairs.  The 
novelty in Strafford’s impeachment is the charge of promoting tyranny 
through subversion of law.  What makes this allegation particularly striking 
is that it depended on Coke’s view that law exists independent of the will of 
the King.  Everyone knew that all Strafford’s actions were taken with the 
King’s sanction in pursuit of the King’s policies.  Thus, the “arbitrary and 
tyrannical government against law”162 Strafford was accused of promoting 
was the absolute rule of the king administered through unaccountable 
ministers and prerogative courts.  The articles also alleged that Strafford 
promoted tyranny by encouraging the king to dismiss Parliament.163  In 
effect, Commons charged Strafford with high treason for putting into action 
Charles’ theory of kingship.164  Even the charge that Strafford had urged 
Charles to bring the “foreign” Irish army to England to levy war against the 
people only makes sense if one believes that a king has no right to use force 
against rebellious subjects. 
All the allegations in Strafford’s articles of impeachment were 
particulars in the overarching capital charge of high treason.  As multiple 
commentators have observed, this necessarily implied the existence of two 
theories of treason—there could be treasons against the person of the 
monarch, but also treason against the constitution of the state.165  John Pym, 
leader of the Commons, argued when prosecuting Stafford before the House 
of Lords, that “this crime of subverting the laws, and introducing an arbitrary 
and tyrannical government, is contrary to the pact and covenant between a 
King and his people . . . the legal union of allegiance and protection.”166  He 
added that, “to alter the settled frame and constitution of government is 
treason in any state.”167 
Despite Pym’s confident declaration, the Lords hesitated to convict to 
Strafford, in part because Strafford was able to refute the factual basis of 
some charges and, as some scholars have argued, in part because there was 
lingering doubt that what Strafford had done amounted to treason as 
 
in England itself.  The first reading would have been unobjectionable, and as noted, even the second 
was treason only if one believed that a king may not use force against his own rebellious subjects. 
 162.  HOWELL, VOL. III, supra note 131, at 1385–86. 
 163.  Id. at 1388–89. 
 164.  D. ALAN ORR, TREASON AND THE STATE: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 
ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 61 (2002)(“Essentially, Strafford stood trial for his role in Charles I’s personal 
rule of 1629-40. . . .”). 
 165.  BERGER, supra note 10, at 33. 
 166.  8 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE PASSAGES OF STATE, 
WEIGHTY MATTERS IN LAW, REMARKABLE PROCEEDINGS IN FIVE PARLIAMENTS 666 (1721). 
 167.  Id. at 669. 
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previously defined by law.168  Twentieth century lawyer and politician F.E. 
Smith, Lord Birkenhead, himself a Lord Chancellor of England, maintained 
that in helping Charles to, “substitute arbitrary government for the rule of 
law,” Strafford committed a “high crime” and a “heinous” offense, but not 
the technical crime of treason because his behavior did not violate the statute 
defining treason.169  In the end, for reasons not fully understood, Parliament 
abandoned the Commons’ articles of impeachment and substituted a bill of 
attainder alleging high treason on the same grounds.  It passed both 
houses.170  Unlike an impeachment, attainder required the consent of the 
sovereign, but Charles yielded to pressure, gave his assent, and Strafford was 
beheaded on May 12, 1641.171 
The Commons moved against Archbishop Laud at the same time as 
Strafford.  Laud, too, was arrested and impeached by the House of Commons 
for high treason in December 1640,172 but he was imprisoned and his trial 
was delayed until 1644.173  Several sets of articles of impeachment were 
prepared against Laud, but both sets mirrored those against Strafford in 
 
 168.  See generally ORR, supra note 164, at 62. 
 
 
 169.  Lord Birkenhead observed: 
Was Strafford guilty of treason?  The answer in strict law must clearly be in the 
negative.  Treason is an offence against the allegiance due to the Sovereign in aid 
and counsel.  The underlying theory of the Commons that there were fundamental 
laws, and that to aim at overturning them was treason, is erroneous.  In legal theory 
there are in this country no laws, not even the Act of Settlement or the Act of Union, 
which Parliament may not alter as easily as a Statute providing for by-laws in a 
country parish.  To break the law is a crime.  To break the laws upon which civil 
liberty depends is a high crime.  But to call treason that which falls clearly outside 
the terms of the Statute of Treason does not justify a conviction.  He was charged 
with treason, but at best the evidence proved offences, heinous indeed to the last 
degree, but not treasonable.  Nevertheless, if one sets aside the purely legal aspect 
of the case and regards it from the wider standpoint, there can be little doubt that 
Charles and his advisers were working to substitute arbitrary government for the 
rule of law.  Strafford had shown himself to be a grave menace to the constitution, 
and in that untechnical sense he was a traitor. 
F.E. SMITH, EARL OF BIRKENHEAD, FAMOUS TRIALS OF HISTORY 44–45 (1926).  More recent 
commentators have taken the opposite view, see, e.g., ORR, supra note 164, at 61–100. 
 170.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, 210, 213. 
 171.  Id. at 98. 
 172.  See 4 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 315 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL. 
IV]; CARLTON, supra note 120, at 200–01. 
 173.  Id. at 214. 
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critical respects.174  The principal charge, repeated in various forms, was that 
Laud had committed treason by endeavoring to set up an arbitrary and 
tyrannical government, destroy Parliament, and subvert the rule of law.175  
The primary difference between the Laud and Strafford impeachment 
charges was that Laud was alleged to have promoted tyrannical government 
primarily in the ecclesiastical sphere of the king’s sovereignty, while 
Strafford’s transgressions fell in the secular realm.176  The technical treason 
case against Laud was, if anything, weaker than that against Strafford.  Laud 
had no military authority and could not be charged with marshaling foreign 
armies against the people.  His actions, however brutal, high-handed, and 
subversive of Parliament and the common law courts, were taken both with 
the King’s sanction and through established institutions like the courts of 
Star Chamber and High Commission.  Indeed, it was explicitly argued on 
Laud’s behalf that, though the allegations against him may indeed have been 
“crimes and misdemeanors,” they were not in law treason.177  Nonetheless, 
Parliament viewed Laud as a dangerous pillar of the King’s disposition to 
absolutism.  In late October 1643, Commons suddenly abandoned the formal 
impeachment process and drew up a bill of attainder asserting that the 
charges in Laud’s impeachment had been proven, thus meriting his attainder 
for high treason.178  Both houses passed the bill in January 1644, rejected a 
pardon of the Archbishop the King had issued the previous year by deeming 
it invalid against parliamentary condemnation, and sent Laud to the 
executioner.179 
Charles I’s conflict with his Parliament degenerated into the English 
Civil War (1642-1651) and led to his own execution, the kingless 
Commonwealth of England (1649-1660), the Cromwell Protectorate, and 
finally in 1660 the restoration of the English monarchy under Charles II.180  
Although Parliament invited the Stuart monarchs back to the throne, it 
remained protective of its own authority and suspicious of royal overreach.  
One of Charles II’s chief ministers, the Earl of Clarendon, a stout monarchist, 
fell afoul of his political enemies in Parliament beginning in 1663.  Two 
 
 174.  Apparently, there is some doubt about the exact terms of the articles, due in part to the 
absence of contemporaneous records and in part to the fact that Laud’s trial did not occur for five 
years after his arrest and multiple sets of charges seem to have been drawn against him.  Id. at 217. 
 175.  HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 321–30 (articles passed by Commons in December 
1640); id. at 332–36 (additional articles passed in October 1643).  He was also accused of 
subverting the Protestant faith in England and promoting Catholicism, as well as bribery. 
 176.  ORR, supra note 163, at 101–02. 
 177.  HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 585; CARLTON, supra note 152, at 218, 222. 
 178.  HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 599; CARLTON, supra note 152, at 223. 
 179.  HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 600; CARLTON, supra note 152, at 223. 
 180.  See generally RICHARD CUST, CHARLES I: A POLITICAL LIFE (2005); HIBBERT, supra 
note 89.  
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efforts were made to impeach him: the first was widely deemed frivolous, 
but the second, in 1667, succeeded in driving him from office.181  The 
primary charges in the second impeachment involved supposed advice to the 
king to raise a standing army and govern through it rather than Parliament, 
seeking money for the crown from France in order to evade parliamentary 
control of royal finance, and abuses of habeas corpus for sending prisoners 
out of England and holding them without trial.182  The parallels to the cases 
of Strafford and Laud are plain; again the essence of the allegations was that 
Clarendon was subverting the constraints on monarchy imposed by the 
elected parliament and the common law.  Clarendon’s impeachment was 
technically unresolved because he fled to France before final votes could be 
taken in the House of Lords, but Parliament thereafter passed a bill of 
banishment to keep him out of the country.183 
The final notable impeachment under the Stuart kings was that of the 
Earl of Danby in 1678.  Still at loggerheads with Parliament over finance, 
Charles II authorized Danby to write letters to an intermediary, offering the 
French king British neutrality in the Franco-Dutch war for a huge cash 
annuity paid to Charles.184  When the letters leaked, Parliament promptly 
impeached Danby for treason.185  The form of the charge was in one respect 
strikingly similar to those against Clarendon, Laud, and Strafford in that he 
was alleged to have “endeavored to subvert the ancient and well established 
form of government in this kingdom, and instead thereof to introduce an 
arbitrary and tyrannical way of government.”186  The essence of the 
complaint was also similar to prior impeachments in that Commons was 
perturbed that Danby was simultaneously attempting to circumvent 
parliamentary control over the king’s revenue and carrying out a pro-French 
foreign policy which many parliamentarians believed contrary to the 
country’s interests.  The Lords were markedly reluctant to convict a minister 
for treason for carrying out the king’s policy, however obnoxious they found 
that policy to be, but the matter was not resolved because the King prorogued 
Parliament to stop the proceedings.  A later Parliament, nonetheless, revived 
 
 181.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 398–400. 
 182.  6 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 330–34 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, 
VOL. VI].  Clarendon was also charged with the by-now customary allegations of corruption and 
official incompetence.  Id. at 333–34. 
 183.  See Clayton Roberts, The Impeachment of the Earl of Clarendon, 13 CAMBRIDGE HIST. 
J. 1, 15 (1957); HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 174–78. 
 184.  11 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 600–18 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, 
VOL. XI]. 
 185.  Id. at 619–21. 
 186.  Id. at 620–27. 
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the charges and ruled that an attempt by the King to pardon Danby was 
ineffective against an impeachment.187  In the end, Danby spent some years 
in custody before the whole business was dropped.188 
 
 
 
 
V.  The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Last Large Flurry 
of British Impeachments (1715-1716) 
The last king of the Stuart lineage was James II.189  His Catholicism and 
various of his policies proved so obnoxious to leading elements in Parliament 
and England at large, that they invited William of Orange the statholder of 
the Netherlands and husband of Mary (James II’s daughter) to invade and 
assume the British crown jointly with Mary.190  He did so, successfully and 
largely bloodlessly, in 1688.  The removal of James II and ascendance of 
William and Mary became known as the “Glorious Revolution.”191  It is 
important for our purposes, primarily because a condition of William and 
Mary’s assumption of the throne was the passage and acceptance by the 
crown of a Bill of Rights that codified increased parliamentary authority at 
the expense of royal prerogatives.192  Although the transition would not be 
complete for many years, the Glorious Revolution is commonly said to be 
the beginning of constitutional monarchy in Britain.  Accordingly, as 
ministers and officials became less and less agents of the monarchs and more 
and more the creatures of Parliament, impeachment assumed decreasing 
importance. 
There was a flurry of impeachments in 1715-1716 occasioned by the 
turmoil caused by the death in 1714 of Queen Anne, the daughter and 
successor of William and Mary,193 and the accession of George I, a 
 
 187.  BERGER, supra note 10, at 45. 
 188.  ACKROYD, supra note 92, at 451. 
 189.  Stuart Family Tree, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education 
/resources/jacobite-1715/stuart-family-tree/. 
 190.  PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 59; HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra 
note 88, at 193–94; DAVID OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGNS OF JAMES II AND WILLIAM III (2nd ed. 
1957). 
 191.  PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 59.  See generally J.R. JONES, THE 
REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND (1988). 
 192.  HOLDSWORTH, VOL. VI, supra note 88, at 240–43; KEITH, supra note 30, at 8–9 
(enumerating the provisions of the Bill of Rights of 1689). 
 193.  Mary died of smallpox in 1694. Abbas M. Behbehani, The Smallpox Story: Life and 
Death of an Old Disease, 47 MICROBIOLOGICAL REV. 455, 458 (1983), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.g 
ov/pmc/articles/PMC281588/pdf/microrev00019-0005.pdf.  William continued to reign until his 
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Hanoverian prince who assumed the throne only because he was Anne’s 
closest Protestant relative.194  Anne’s death raised hopes for restoration of a 
Catholic monarchy in the person of James Francis Edward Stuart, the “Old 
Pretender.”  The result was armed rebellion in Scotland, known as the 
Jacobite Rising of 1715, which was joined by a number of Scottish peers.195  
When the rising failed, seven peers were impeached for high treason and 
several were executed.196  Likewise, after George I was installed on the 
throne, parliamentary critics of the foreign policy pursued under Queen Anne 
impeached the Earl of Oxford, Viscount Bolingbroke, and the Earl of 
Strafford in 1715 for giving “pernicious” advice to the queen to enter into 
the Treaty of Utrecht in the War of the Spanish Succession.197 
VI.  The Impeachment of Warren Hastings 
Impeachment largely disappeared from the British scene once the issue 
of parliamentary supremacy was settled by the Glorious Revolution and its 
aftermath, and the issue of Protestant succession was firmly resolved by the 
accession of George I and the failure of the Jacobite rising of 1715.  The only 
notable exception was the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Governor 
General of India, that, by happenstance, was beginning just as the 
Philadelphia convention commenced in 1787. 
At the time Americans achieved independence, there had not been an 
impeachment of a Crown official for misconduct in office since 1725198 and 
 
death in 1702 after a fall from a horse. 8 RICHARD LODGE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE 
RESTORATION TO THE DEATH OF WILLIAM III 450 (1910).  
 194.  ANDREW C. THOMPSON, GEORGE II: KING AND ELECTOR 95 (2011). 
 195.  15 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1129, 1159 (1816) [hereinafter 
HOWELL, VOL. XV]. 
 196.  HOWELL, VOL. XV, supra note 195, at 762, 806; SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 150–51. 
 197.  SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 62; BERGER, supra note 10, at 71–72.  The charges against 
Oxford and Bolingbroke were couched as both treason and high crimes and misdemeanors.  
Strafford’s charges were labeled high crimes and misdemeanors.  Bolingbroke was attainted and 
later pardoned.  SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 152.  Strafford was never tried.  Id. at 156.  Oxford was 
tried and acquitted.  Id. at 162.  In addition, in 1715, the Duke of Ormond was impeached for 
treasonous collusion with French forces while acting as commander of British forces in the 
Netherlands during the war.  HOWELL, VOL. XV, supra note 195, at 1007.  
 198.  In 1725, the Earl of Macclesfield was impeached, convicted, fined, and imprisoned for 
corruption during his term as Lord Chancellor.  16 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF 
STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 
767–68 (1816).  The impeachment procedure was also employed in 1746 to try and execute Simon 
Fraser, Lord Lovat, for his role in the Scottish rebellion of 1745.  18 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS 529–857 (1816).  Lovat’s demise differed from the sorts of impeachment that 
concern us here because the choice of the impeachment vehicle had nothing to do with imposing 
legislative constraint on crown policy or removing a corrupt minister.  Lord Lovat was a peer of 
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the practice was on the verge of becoming a mere relic of an earlier age.  
However, complaints about Hastings’ conduct in India had been brewing 
since his retirement and return to Great Britain in 1785.  In April 1786, the 
great orator, conservative essayist,199 and supporter of American liberties,200 
Edmund Burke, presented specific accusations against Hastings in the House 
of Commons.201  On May 10, 1787, Commons approved articles of 
impeachment202 and on May 21, 1787, less than a week before the 
Philadelphia convention was called to order on May 27, Hastings was 
arrested and taken before the House of Lords to hear the charges.203 
Hastings’ impeachment trial before the Lords did not begin until 
February 1788, and it dragged on at irregular intervals for seven years until, 
in April 1795, he was acquitted on all charges.204  The verdict is unimportant 
for our purposes because it was handed down long after the American 
constitution was ratified in 1788, and thus could have had no influence on 
either the Philadelphia drafters or the state ratifiers of the American 
impeachment mechanism.  But the existence of the Hastings impeachment 
and the nature of the charges were well-known in 1787-88, and, as mentioned 
at the outset of this Article, they were specifically mentioned in the key 
exchange between George Mason and James Madison that produced the 
constitutional definition of impeachable conduct: “treason, bribery, or other 
High Crimes and Misdemeanors.”205 
Hastings’ case was a cause célèbre throughout the English-speaking 
world, and was of particular fascination to newly independent Americans 
because it centered on Hastings’ conduct as the chief administrative officer 
of the major British colonial possessions outside of the western 
hemisphere—the growing accumulation of territory that would in time 
become the Indian Raj.  From 1772 to 1785, Hastings had served as the first 
Governor General of British territories and interests in India.206  The position 
 
the realm who had taken up arms against the king and, according to the law of the time, could only 
be condemned to death by trial in the House of Lords.  Hence, his impeachment.   
 199.  Perhaps Burke’s most famous written work was EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790). 
 200.  SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, IN DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC LIBERTY 102, 161–62 (1976); 
CHARLES R. RITCHESON, EDMUND BURKE AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1976), https://www 
.questia.com/read/11097739/edmund-burke-and-the-american-revolution. 
 201.  SMITH, supra note 169, at 168–69. 
 202.  Id. at 170. 
 203.  PATRICK TURNBULL, WARREN HASTINGS 205 (1975).  
 204.  4 SPEECHES OF THE MANAGERS AND COUNSEL IN TRIAL OF WARREN HASTINGS, at lxiv–
lxviii (E.A. Bond ed., 1861). 
 205.  See FARRAND, RECORDS, VOL. 2, supra note 2, at 550; THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: FULLY REVISED 293 (David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014).  
 206.  LAWRENCE JAMES, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 135 (1994). 
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was created to centralize administration of what was, at the time, a hodge-
podge of territorial possessions, trading concessions, and treaty relationships 
with indigenous rulers across the Indian subcontinent largely conducted by 
and through the British East India Company.207  The Company was to 
modern eyes an anomalous creature.  It was, in part, a private corporation 
and trading venture, but it also behaved as a government with a huge private 
army drawing its authority from acts of Parliament, grants from or treaties 
with native Indian rulers, or simple right of conquest.208  The Company’s 
critics viewed it as exploitative and tending to corrupt both the regions it 
ruled, and politics back home.209  The creation of the office of Governor 
General and Hastings’ appointment to that post were part of an effort to 
restrain the Company’s excesses and bring its activities and possessions 
under more direct control by the British government.210 
Hastings’ supporters, both at the time and since, viewed him as an 
earnest, hardworking, aggressive, and on the whole successful administrator 
who laid the foundation for British control of India and integration of its 
possessions there into a system of empire.  His critics saw in him the 
personification of the errors and excesses of imperialism and attributed to 
him both personal corruption and egregious abuses of authority.211  The 
twenty-two articles of impeachment against Hastings charged him with a 
miscellany of misbehavior,212 including disregard of instructions from the 
Company’s directors,213 mismanagement of regions under his administrative 
control (often to the disadvantage of the native population),214 high-handed 
 
 207.  KEITH, supra note 30, at 512–13. See generally JOHN KEAY, THE HONORABLE 
COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (1993). 
 208.  SMITH, supra note 169, at 164. 
 209.  Id. at 164–68. See also The East India Company: The Company that ruled the waves, THE 
ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2011), https://www.economist.com/christmas-specials /2011/12/17/the-
company-that-ruled-the-waves.  
 210.  See generally Neil Sen, Warren Hastings and British Sovereign Authority in Bengal, 25 
J. OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY 59 (1987). 
 211.  SMITH, supra note 169, at 165–76. 
 212.  SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 167–88. 
 213.  For example, the seventh article alleges that Hastings violated Company policy in favor 
of securing goods and services through publicly advertised solicitations with the “most reasonable 
proposal” to be accepted when he entered into a contract with George Templer for draught animals 
and provisions at rates 30% higher than a competing proposal.  Id. at 173.  Articles ten and eleven 
allege other violations of company contracting policies.  Id. at 174–75.  Articles nine and ten also 
relate to Hasting’s alleged disregard of instructions from the Company board.  Id. at 174. 
 214.  Articles five and sixteen allege mismanagement of the affairs of the provinces of 
Farruckabad and Oude.  Id. at 177. 
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or deceitful dealings with local rulers,215 misconduct of local wars,216 and 
allegations of corruption benefiting either Hastings himself or other 
Company officials.217  A cynic might characterize most of the charges as 
merely behaving like an efficient imperialist.  None of the charges could 
fairly be classed as criminal conduct in any technical sense.  Even the 
allegations of corruption were phrased so vaguely that it would have been 
impossible to frame them within any existing criminal statute.  The essence 
of the claims against him was abuse of official power.  This feature of the 
articles was so patent that their principle author, Edmund Burke, was obliged 
to expend his eloquence contending that Hastings’ offenses were against 
natural law or ancestral principles of the British constitution rather than any 
particular statute.  In his opening statement, Burke said the charges against 
Hastings “were crimes, not against forms, but against those eternal laws of 
justice, which are our rule and our birthright.  His offenses are not, in formal, 
technical language, but in reality, in substance and effect, High Crimes and 
High Misdemeanors.”218 
Burke’s description of Hastings’ offenses is important not merely 
because it confirms, once again, that in British practice impeachable offenses 
need not have been indictable crimes.  In addition, Burke’s words, together 
with other facts about the Hastings case, illuminate a broader point.  Note 
that Commons voted to impeach Hastings not to remove an obnoxious 
official from office, nor to hobble the policy of a willful monarch.  Hastings 
had already resigned his office and retired two years before his 
impeachment.219  And by 1787, Great Britain was already a parliamentary 
monarchy in which the personal authority of the king was largely subordinate 
to the parliamentary majority.  Thus, the impeachment of Hastings only 
makes sense if some other objective was in view. 
Certainly, one cannot ignore that the move against Hastings had 
immediate political objectives.  For opponents of the government of William 
 
 215.  Articles two through six, as well as articles fourteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, and 
twenty-two, fall generally in this category.  Id. at 168–73, 176–81, 185–88. 
 216.  Article one alleges that Hastings violated instructions not to engage in “any offensive war 
whatever” by instigating and employing British troops in a war against the Rohilla people.  Id. at 
167–68.  Article fourteen relates to a war between Ranna of Gohud and Madajee Scindia.  Id. at 
176.  Article twenty concerns a war with the Mahrattas.  Id. at 182–84. 
 217.  Articles eight and sixteen allege personal or collective corruption.  Id. at 174, 177. 
 218.  EDMUND BURKE, ON EMPIRE, LIBERTY, AND REFORM: SPEECHES AND LETTERS 388 
(David Bromwich ed., 2000). 
 219.  THOMAS BABBINGTON MACAULAY, Warren Hastings, in 1 CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL 
ESSAYS (A.J. Grieve ed., 1907), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2332/2332-h/2332-h.htm. 
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Pitt the Younger, Hastings was a convenient whipping boy.220  But Burke, at 
least, had larger aims.  For him and like-minded others, the Hastings case 
was an opportunity to establish fundamental points about the nature of the 
emerging British Empire, the standards of conduct to be expected of 
government servants of that Empire, and the rights of the Empire’s 
subjects.221  In this sense, Burke’s impeachment of Hastings was a 
continuance of his arguments before the American Revolution in favor of 
colonists’ enjoyment of the traditional rights of Englishmen.  In framing the 
charges against Hastings, Burke was asserting that the Empire would be a 
unitary whole in which officials would be subject to central authority and 
obliged to operate in accordance with the rule of statutory law and natural 
justice.  And he was making bold claims for the rights of British subjects, 
regardless of national origin.  Perhaps the most notable feature of Burke’s 
charges against Hastings is their insistence that the primary victims of 
Hastings’ alleged misbehavior were, not Englishmen or British commercial 
interests, but the indigenous rulers and inhabitants of India.  Burke does not 
deny that Britain may rule an Empire, but he insists that the peoples under 
its sway not be robbed, exploited, or impoverished.  
Whether this view carried the day in the Hastings impeachment or in 
the development of the British Empire after the 1780s is not important for 
our purposes.  The key point is that, at the same moment Americans were 
redesigning their government in Philadelphia, Burke was using impeachment 
as a vehicle, not for the chastisement of one man, but to establish basic 
constitutional principles—and important Americans were aware of his 
efforts and wanted a similar power for themselves. 
VII.  Lessons of British Impeachments for American Practice 
British impeachment practice is important for students of the American 
constitution because the Framers were conscious heirs to British traditions 
of representative government and because at Philadelphia they settled on 
language to define the scope of impeachable conduct—“Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”—drawn directly from British 
impeachment precedents.222  As noted at the outset, whether the Framers 
 
 220.  Chris Monaghan, In Defence of Intrinsic Human Rights: Edmund Burke’s Controversial 
Prosecution of Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, 2 L., CRIME AND HISTORY 58, 63–
64 (2011), http://lawcrimehistory.org/journal/vol.1%20issue2%202011/Monaghan.pdf. 
 221.  P.J. MARSHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS 15–16 (1965).  See 
generally THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, WARREN HASTINGS (1886); JOHN MORLEY, 
EDMUND BURKE, A HISTORICAL STUDY (1924). 
 222.  This phrase also appears in some American impeachments of the colonial and post-
Revolution-but-pre-Constitution periods.  Those impeachments and their likely effect on the 
Founders’ thinking are discussed in Chapter Three of BOWMAN, HIGH CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS, supra note 11. 
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meant to adopt British language, particularly the phrase “high crimes and 
misdemeanors,” as a term of art tightly restricting the scope of American 
impeachments by reference to British practice, and if that was their intention, 
whether we should honor it, are questions for another time.  For the moment, 
it is necessary only to ascertain how the British understood impeachment, 
because a proper reading of British precedents sets the baseline minimum for 
the scope of American impeachments.  We can fairly draw at least the 
following conclusions. 
A.  Impeachment, Crime, Treason, and Retrospective 
Punishment 
As noted above, a persistent conundrum of British impeachment 
proceedings arose from the dual character of impeachment.  It was a political 
tool, but was also criminal insofar as conviction triggered severe personal 
penalties far beyond mere removal from office.  Thus, the growing 
parliamentary resistance to absolutist royal rule and affinity for government 
under statutory and common law that produced some of the most memorable 
impeachments necessarily implied that even politically dangerous ministers 
ought not be personally punished for conduct not previously specified as 
illegal.  This tension existed in all British impeachments, but was most acute 
when treason was among the charges. 
Indeed, many parliamentary arguments about retrospective or 
declaratory treason seem to have been driven primarily by concern about the 
extreme penalties for conviction on that ground.  Those impeached for 
treason, or their parliamentary defenders, were often heard to argue that they 
may well have committed crimes, even serious ones, but not treason.223  The 
real issue in many such cases seems to have been that Commons wanted, not 
merely removal of an obnoxious minister from office, but also his physical 
and civil death in the form of execution and/or deprivation of lands, titles, 
and wealth.  The technical arguments about whether an accused’s conduct 
fell within previous definitions of treason often seem driven by resistance, 
 
 223.  Among the numerous instances of this phenomenon are: (1) the statement of Charles I 
when he went to the House of Lords to intercede on behalf of Lord Strafford that, “I cannot 
condemn him of High-Treason; yet I cannot say I clear him of Misdemeanor.”  HOWELL, VOL. III, 
supra note 131, at 1513; 2 WILLIAM COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 755 
(1807); 5 JAMES MCINTOSH, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 253 (1835).  (2) The statement of the Bishop 
of Lincoln, a member of the House of Lords during the 1715 impeachment trial of the Earl of 
Oxford for treason, that, “To high crimes and misdemeanours I could readily agree, and I hoped, 
and therefore wished, that their prosecution might have stopped there.  The H[ouse] of Commons 
have gone further.”  Clyve Jones, The Opening of the Impeachment of Robert Harley, Earl of 
Oxford, June to September 1715: The ‘Memorandum’ of William Wake, Bishop of Lincoln, 4 
ELECTRONIC BRITISH LIBRARY J. 4, 7 (2015). 
BOWMAN_5.6.19 UPDATED FINAL FOR ONLINE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2019  3:58 PM 
782 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:4 
particularly among the Lords, against the idea that faithful service to an 
erring King could result not merely in removal from office, but extinction. 
For example, it has been argued that the last-minute switch from 
impeachment to attainder in the 1640 cases of both Lord Strafford and 
Archbishop Laud, and the absence of formal convictions in the House of 
Lords in later impeachments, arose from the Lords’ reluctance to impeach 
officials for treason for conduct not clearly treasonous under existing law.  
But to draw this conclusion from the Strafford and Laud affairs is to ignore 
their ultimate fates—in both cases, both houses of Parliament approved bills 
of attainder based on the same charges contained in the articles of 
impeachment and condemned the accused to death.224  Whatever Parliament 
thought it was doing, it was not forswearing the power to punish, as treason, 
conduct that had not expressly been held to be treasonous before.225 
The general question of whether Parliament could impeach an official 
for treason based on conduct not unambiguously defined as treason, by either 
statute or existing precedent, has been the subject of dense scholarly debate.  
Raoul Berger concluded in his influential Nixon-era book on impeachment 
that Parliament had the power to declare what he called “retrospective 
treasons.”226  Historian Clayton Roberts, wrote a biting rebuttal.227  In 
essence, he argued that while the Stuart-era House of Commons voted 
articles of impeachment alleging innovative theories of treason—what he 
calls “declarative treasons”—for Strafford, Laud, and other officials, these 
impeachments rarely went to trial in the House of Lords, and never resulted 
in convictions.  Roberts concluded that the Lords were consciously resisting 
the claim that they had the power to define and punish declaratory treason.228 
Roberts’ argument from parliamentary practice has some force.  He 
cleverly characterizes Berger’s emphasis on the treason charges brought by 
the Commons, rather than the inaction of the Lords on those charges, as an 
argument for the prosecution’s view of law as opposed to the view of those 
who sit as judges.229  But he falls victim in some degree to the reverse fallacy 
by relying heavily on contemporaneous arguments from defenders of the 
impeached officials for explanations of why impeachments did not achieve 
conviction in the Lords.  Moreover, he tends to gloss over the fact that in 
multiple cases the Lords failed to convict, not because of any principled legal 
judgment about the nature of treason, but due to events such as the king’s 
 
 224.  See supra notes 157-78, and accompanying text. 
 225.  See BERGER, supra note 10, at 35–52. 
 226.  BERGER, supra note 10, at 7–52. 
 227.  Clayton Roberts, The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 
84 YALE L.J. 1419, 1427 (1975). 
 228.  Id. at 1423–27. 
 229.  Id. at 1426. 
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dissolution of Parliament (Danby) or the accused’s flight from the country 
(Clarendon).  In any event, his insistence that the judgment of the House of 
Commons on what constitutes an impeachable treason is of no legal weight 
pushes too far the analogy of parliamentary impeachment to an ordinary 
criminal trial.  In an English impeachment, the actions of both the Commons 
and the Lords (like those of the American House and Senate) are moved by 
complex judgments on law, fact, and politics.  In England, just as in the 
United States, the decisions of both the lower and upper house create 
precedent.  The fact is that throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, the Commons repeatedly impeached ministers, judges, and 
officials for “declaratory” or “retrospective” treason and thereby secured its 
objective of politically neutering those impeached, whether by 
transformation of the impeachment to an attainder, an order of banishment, 
or the defendant’s flight from the jurisdiction.230  One may disapprove of 
Parliament’s persistent practice of loosely defining treason to achieve 
political ends, but it is idle to deny that this was their practice.231 
The potentially grisly result of an English treason conviction had 
considerable influence on the Framers of the American constitution.  The 
Framers quite consciously removed the tension between the political 
necessity of a non-electoral mechanism for removing erring officials and the 
criminal theory rule against retrospective personal punishment by barring 
 
 230.  Roberts’ argument about treason seems misconceived on one other point.  He contends 
that the House of Lords acted as judges and was empowered to find treason only by reference to 
pre-existing statutes or common law precedents, but he seems to misconceive the nature of common 
law judging.  Even in the modern United States where courts have expressly disavowed the power 
to create new common law crimes, the power to interpret statutes, regulations, and the constitution 
itself is de facto the power to make new law.  See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954) (finding in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a previously unknown 
prohibition against racially segregated education facilities in the United States).   
In the England of the Stuart period, this was even more the case because the “common law” was 
judge-made law––an evolving set of principles and particular rules created by judges ruling by 
analogy to prior decisions.  To say that the Lords could not declare new treasons because they had 
only the power of common law judges is a contradiction in terms.  Common law judges created 
“new” crimes all the time (even if they did not give their creations new names) by beginning with 
old principles and precedents and using logic or the exigencies of changed circumstances to expand 
the law.  
 231.  The great British judge Sir Matthew Hale in his monumental work, History of the Pleas 
of the Crown, was extremely critical of what he called “constructive treasons,” decrying the danger 
of departing from the precise terms of treason statutes “to multiply and inhanfe crimes into treafon 
by ambiguous and general words, as accroaching of royal power, fubverting of fundamental laws, 
and the like.”  1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS 
OF THE CROWN 86 (1736) [hereinafter HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN].  However, the point of his 
criticism was to express disapproval of Parliamentary practice, not to deny its existence.  Indeed, 
he seems to grudgingly admit the power of Parliament to adjudge new treasons in particular cases, 
while resisting the inference that such judgments create precedent for future cases outside of the 
parliamentary setting.  Id. at 262–64. 
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bills of attainder232 and limiting the consequence of a successful 
impeachment to removal from office, leaving personal punishment to the 
criminal courts.233  In the American setting, the fierce debates over 
Parliament’s power to declare retrospective treasons lose their point, leaving 
only the question of the kinds of behavior that demand removal from office 
for the good of the nation.  Moreover, in the four centuries from 1376 to 
1787, a great many British officials were impeached for offenses other than 
treason.234  The most obvious lesson of these cases is that Parliament 
routinely impeached, and often convicted people, for conduct that was 
neither an indictable crime nor a plain violation of any existing law.  We 
have already discussed the Duke of Buckingham, impeached in 1626, for, 
among other things, holding a plurality of offices, mismanaging his office as 
Lord Admiral, and loaning English ships to the French king to use against 
Protestant Huguenots;235 the Earl of Strafford, impeached in 1715, for giving 
“pernicious” advice to the crown to enter into the Treaty of Utrecht in the 
War of the Spanish Succession;236 as well as Warren Hastings, impeached 
for conduct that even his chief accuser conceded were not crimes.237 
Other examples include: 
In 1642, Commons impeached Sir Richard Gurney, Lord Mayor of 
London, principally it appears because Gurney made certain proclamations 
in support of Charles I, attempted to suppress a petition of grievances 
directed to Parliament, supported another petition critical of Parliament,238 
and failed to transfer certain munitions to a storehouse in London contrary 
to the orders of Parliament.  On the strength of these allegations, Gurney was 
charged with, among other things striving to “bring in an arbitrary and 
tyrannical government.”239  He was convicted, stripped of the mayoralty, 
disqualified from further office, and cast into prison.240 
 
 232.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.   
 233.  Id. at § 3, cl. 7. 
 234.  See supra Parts III & IV. 
 235.  See supra note 158, and accompanying text. 
 236.  As noted above, supra note 158 and accompanying text, Strafford was impeached, along 
with the Earl of Oxford and Viscount Bolingbroke, for essentially the same offenses, but Strafford’s 
charges were labeled high crimes and misdemeanors only, while Oxford and Bolingbroke were also 
charged with treason. SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 151–62; BERGER, supra note 10, at 71–72. 
 237.  See supra notes 159–180, and accompanying text. 
 238.  HOWELL, VOL. IV, supra note 172, at 160–63.  Several other men, including George 
Benyon and Sir Edward Dering, were impeached around the same time for promoting a “false, 
dangerous, and seditious petition” impugning Parliament.  Id. at 141–43, 151–52.   
 239.  Id. at 159–63. 
 240.  Id. at 165–66.  The articles contain no general descriptor of the charges.  One source says 
that the Speaker of the House of Commons informed Gurney that he was charged with “High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”  Gurney’s various pleadings in answer to the charges refer to them as 
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In 1668, Peter Pett, a commoner in charge of the naval shipyard, was 
impeached for allegedly failing to secure portions of the British fleet from 
Dutch attack.241 
In 1701, the Earl of Orford, Lord Somers, Lord Halifax, and William, 
Earl of Portland were impeached for advising King William to enter into 
treaties of which their parliamentary critics disapproved, as well as for 
garden-variety corruption and, in the cases of Orford and Somers, playing a 
role in the granting of letters of marque (a commission to act as a private 
naval vessel) to William Kidd, who turned pirate as the infamous “Captain 
Kidd.”  All were acquitted.242 
In 1710, an Anglican minister named Henry Sacheverell was 
impeached and convicted for preaching a sermon at St. Paul’s attacking 
church dissenters and those in government disposed to tolerate them.243  He 
was convicted, banned from preaching for three years, and his sermons were 
ordered to be burned by the public hangman.244 
B.  The Meaning of “High Crimes and Misdemeanors” in British 
Practice 
Careful perusal of four hundred years of British impeachments 
convinces me that there was never any precise definition or even well-settled 
understanding of what constituted impeachable conduct.  With increasing 
frequency beginning in the 1600s, Parliament employed the phrase “high 
crimes and misdemeanors” at the beginning of articles of impeachment to 
describe the list of offenses specified in the body of the document.  But I find 
no indication that this phrase, so critical to discussions of the impeachment 
power under the U.S. constitution, was for the British ever a term of art in 
the sense of necessarily including or excluding certain kinds of conduct.  A 
reasonable analogy in American practice is the common use of phrases like 
“unlawfully and feloniously” at the beginning of each count of a criminal 
indictment (“On or about January 1, 2019, the defendant, Sam Smith, did 
 
“crimes and misdemeanors” or as “offences, practices, contempts, and misdemeanors.”  Id. at 163–
64. 
 241.  HOWELL, VOL. VI, supra note 182, at 865–67.  See also THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: 
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1660–1690 (B.D. Henning, ed., 2006), http://www.historyofparliamento 
nline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/pett-peter-1610-1672. 
 242.  XIV T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE 
YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 233–349 (1816).  See generally Chester 
Kirby, The Four Lords and the Partition Treaty, 52 AM. HIST. REV. 477 (1947).  Whether Kidd 
was really a pirate is disputed.  See RICHARD ZACKS, THE PIRATE HUNTER: THE TRUE STORY OF 
CAPTAIN KIDD (2003). 
 243.  HOWELL, VOL. XV, supra note 195, at 1–35. 
 244.  Id. at 29. 
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unlawfully and feloniously” commit whatever crime he is being charged 
with).  This and similar phrases serve no practical function in American law.  
They notify the defendant that the crime is a felony as opposed to a 
misdemeanor, but even that is superfluous due to the invariable inclusion in 
the indictment of a citation to the relevant statute.  It is the statutory law that 
makes conduct a felony, not the addition of the descriptor “feloniously” in 
the indictment charging violation of a statute. Nonetheless, such phrases 
persist because they are traditional and add a level of solemnity to the 
accusation. 
My sense is that the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” served a 
similar function in British impeachments.  The words became traditional.  
They emphasized the nature and gravity of the accusations in the articles of 
impeachment.  Putting it another way, “high crimes and misdemeanors” was 
a phrase the drafters of British articles of impeachment habitually used to 
preface their description of any conduct for which Parliament thought an 
official should be impeached; it did not refer to a specified set of 
impeachable offenses from which Parliament was obliged to choose if it 
wanted to impeach an official.  As heirs to the English common law tradition, 
parliamentarians would have looked to prior impeachments as creating a 
body of precedent from which they could infer some general principles about 
the scope of properly impeachable conduct in future cases.  But that is as 
much as they or we could say. 
C.  The Scope of Impeachable Conduct in Great Britain 
Parliament impeached people for a strikingly wide variety of official 
misbehavior.245  It is possible to categorize the offenses charged under a 
number of general headings and therefore to gain a fair appreciation of the 
kinds of behavior Parliament thought to be impeachable: 
1.  Non-political Impeachments—Armed Rebellion and Ordinary 
Criminality 
A fair number of British impeachment proceedings resulted purely from 
the ancient requirement that peers of the realm could be tried only by other 
peers, that is by the House of Lords.  Accordingly, if a hereditary peer was 
accused either of armed rebellion against the crown246 or an ordinary felony, 
 
 245.  Parliament occasionally impeached private persons who held no official position.  For 
example, in 1698, John Goudet and nine other merchants were impeached for violating wartime 
trade restrictions by doing business with France; most pled guilty and were fined.  SIMPSON, supra 
note 12, at 141–43.  But consideration of those cases is omitted here as irrelevant to the influence 
of British impeachment practice on the American institution of impeachment. 
 246.  Levying war against the king in his realm was an undoubted capital treason. HALE, PLEAS 
OF THE CROWN, supra note 231, at 130.  
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the proceedings against him would often be framed either as an impeachment 
or in some cases as an appeal directly to the House of Lords.  Examples of 
impeachments for armed rebellion include the seven Scottish lords 
condemned for the 1715 Jacobite Rising247 and the case of Lord Lovat 
executed for his role in the 1745 rising.248  A classic example of impeachment 
for ordinary criminality is the 1666 case against John Viscount Mordaunt for 
unlawfully imprisoning William Tayleur, the surveyor of Windsor Castle, 
and making “improper addresses” to Tayleur’s daughter (a charge later 
historians have interpreted as raping her).249 
2.  Corruption 
The most common charge in British impeachments, even those in which 
Parliament’s primary concerns were political, was some variant of 
corruption.  From the first impeachments of Lord Latimer and Richard Lyons 
in 1376250 right down to Hastings’ case in 1787251, corruption was an almost 
invariable theme.252  Even in the purely political cases, corruption allegations 
were commonly included in the articles of impeachment. 
The essence of all such corruption charges was the misuse of office for 
private gain. Critically, a good many of the corruption charges were probably 
not criminal in the technical sense.  In pre-modern Britain, public service 
was not compensated in the formal, regulated way we think of as customary.  
In large part because the finances of the Crown were commonly so irregular 
that budgeting for standardized salaries was impossible, officeholders were 
rewarded with varying combinations of salaries, allowances, titles, grants of 
land, rights to revenue, fees, monopolies, etc.  Hence, distinguishing between 
proper and improper money-making activities was sometimes difficult.  
Nonetheless, the history of British impeachments illustrates that, even in a 
 
 247.  See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text. 
 248.  See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 249.  John Mordaunt, 1st Viscount Mordaunt, 1626-75, BCW-PROJECT, http://bcw-project.org 
/biography/john-mordaunt (last visited July 19, 2018).  Mordaunt was saved from judgment when 
Charles II prorogued Parliament. HOWELL, VOL. VI, supra note 182, at 785–806. 
 250.  See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text. 
 252.  In addition to those mentioned above, consider the cases of the Lord Treasurer Middlesex 
(1624), HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 109, at 1184; Sir William Penn (1668), HOWELL, VOL. VI, 
supra note 182, at 869–78, SIMPSON, supra note 12, at 132; Edward Seymour, Treasurer of the 
Navy, 8 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH 
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 127 (1816); and the Earl of Macclesfield 
(1725), 16 T.B. HOWELL, COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE 
YEAR 1783, WITH NOTES AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 767 (1816) [hereinafter HOWELL, VOL. 
XVI].   
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system in which public office was expected to produce some private profit, 
Parliament consistently viewed abuse of the system as impeachable.  It was 
understood that officeholders would make a competency, but violation of 
formal rules and informal norms in pursuit of excessive self-enrichment was 
not acceptable. 
This idea became even more powerful in the comparatively straight-
laced American colonies where it would manifest itself in constitutional 
provisions such as the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses.253  For the 
Framers, the connection between the anti-corruption norm254 undergirding 
these clauses and the remedy of impeachment was explicit.  Bribery is 
explicitly named as an impeachable offense, and at least one Framer declared 
that violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause would be impeachable.255 
3.  Incompetence, Neglect of Duty, or Maladministration in Office 
Another consistent theme of British impeachments was allegations of 
incompetence, neglect of duty, or maladministration of office.  Charges of 
this sort often arose in connection with military disasters, including the 
impeachments of Lord Latimer (1376), the Earl of Suffolk (1386), the Duke 
of Buckingham (1626), the Earl of Strafford (1640), and Peter Pett (1668), 
but they were hardly limited to that sphere.  The charges against 
Buckingham, Attorney General Henry Yelverton,256 the Lord Treasurer 
Middlesex (1624), the Earl of Clarendon (1667), Lord Danby (1678), 
Edward Seymour, Treasurer of the Navy (1680),257 and of course Warren 
Hastings (1787) were all grounded in part on maladministration, neglect, or 
sheer ineptitude. And several impeachments were grounded on ministers 
giving the sovereign bad advice.258  The British routinely included 
allegations of this sort under the descriptive heading “high crimes and 
 
 253.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, para. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: 
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, 
Prince, or foreign State.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 6 (prohibiting the President from receiving 
any “Emolument” from the federal government or the states beyond “a Compensation” for his 
“Services” as chief executive). 
 254.  On the anti-corruption norm in the U.S. Constitution, see generally Zephyr Teachout, The 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
 255.  Edmund Randolph was a delegate to both the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 
and the Virginia ratification convention.  During the Virginia convention, he observed, “There is 
another provision against the danger, mentioned by the honorable member, of the President 
receiving emoluments from foreign powers.  If discovered, he may be impeached.” 3 JONATHAN 
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 326 (1827). 
 256.  HOWELL, VOL. II, supra note 87, at 1136. 
 257.  HOWELL, VOL. VIII, supra note 209, at 127. 
 258.  See e.g., supra note 238, and accompanying text. 
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misdemeanors.”  The question of how to harmonize this British precedent 
with the Framers’ abandonment of “maladministration” as a ground for 
impeachment in favor of “high crimes and misdemeanors” is beyond the 
scope of the present Article.  For present purposes, it is enough to say that, 
in light of British precedent, the effect of George Mason’s exchange of the 
two terms is less obvious than it seems. 
4.  Abuse of Power 
Most British impeachments involved some form of abuse of official 
power.  Most of these can be placed in one of the preceding two categories—
corruption or maladministration—insofar as the motive for the abuse was the 
hope of preferment or monetary gain, or the abuse arose primarily due to 
incompetence or neglect.  Nonetheless, some cases involved abuses that 
seem to have been moved by simple bloody-mindedness or the enjoyment of 
exercising unchecked power.  Some of the charges in Hastings’ case fall in 
this category.  Even more apt are the charge against Viscount Mordaunt for 
falsely imprisoning the surveyor of Windsor Castle259 and a case not 
previously mentioned, the impeachment of Chief Justice Scroggs for, among 
other things, “browbeating” witnesses and disparaging them to the jury.260 
5.  Betrayal of the Nation’s Foreign Policy 
Another persistent thread in British impeachments is the charge that the 
impeached minister had pursued a policy at odds with the nation’s basic 
foreign policy interests.  Impeachments on this ground were a constant of 
parliamentary practice beginning with the charges against William de la Pole 
in 1450 for his role in arranging the marriage of Henry VI to Margaret of 
Anjou261 through the 1701 impeachments of the four lords (Orford, Somers, 
Halifax, and Portland) in connection with the Treaty of Partition262 and the 
1715 impeachments of Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Strafford for their 
advocacy of the Treaty of Utrecht,263 and including the 1787 impeachment 
of Warren Hastings over fundamental disagreements about the proper 
 
 259.  See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 260.  BERGER, supra note 10, at 249. 
 261.  PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 17, at 194 
 262.  See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 263.  See supra note 196 and accompanying text.  Other cases include the impeachments of the 
Earl of Middlesex (1624), the Duke of Buckingham, charged with helping the Catholic French king 
against the Protestant French Huguenots (1626), the Earl of Danby, impeached for his role in 
negotiating British neutrality in the Franco-Dutch War (1678).  See supra notes 183-86 and 
accompanying text.  
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relationship of Great Britain to its Indian possessions and the states that 
abutted them.264 
Impeachments for betrayal of the country’s foreign policy objectives 
have received relatively little notice among American impeachment 
scholars, presumably because the only arguably similar American case was 
the first impeachment of Senator William Blount charged in 1797 with 
conspiring to assist the British in acquiring Spanish territory in Florida.265  
However, this line of British precedent deserves renewed attention.  Over 
and over again, Parliament employed impeachment to assert an authority 
independent of the royal executive to define the nation’s true foreign policy 
interests. 
The analogy to the current president’s disparagement or outright 
abandonment of long-established defense and trade relationships with 
democratic states in Europe, the Americas, and Asia in favor of 
mercantilism, “America First” isolationism, and a growing affinity for 
authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Hungary, Turkey, and the 
Philippines is obvious.  It can fairly be argued that, particularly when 
considered in the aggregate, this conduct is far more destructive of American 
interests than Senator Blount’s failed Florida adventure or any of the policies 
for which Parliament routinely impeached royal ministers.  More 
importantly, the active tilt away from the democratic West in favor of 
affiliation with authoritarians is not the manifestation of a considered policy 
difference between the political parties or of a significant body of opinion 
within the military and security establishment.  It is, rather, a purely personal 
tendency suggestive of an affinity for domestic authoritarianism and thus 
shades into the next accepted ground for parliamentary impeachment. 
6.  Subversion of the Constitution and Laws of the Realm 
From the first impeachments in 1376, through the tumults of the Stuart 
period, and right up to the case of Warren Hastings in 1787, Parliament 
employed impeachment against ministers and officials whose actions 
threatened its understanding of proper constitutional order.  More 
particularly, Parliament acted repeatedly against those who sought to enlarge 
or misuse executive/monarchical power at the expense of those elements of 
society whose interests were represented in Parliament, or contrary to the 
legal order established by statutes and the common law courts.  The 
impeachments of Francis Bacon in 1621, the Duke of Buckingham in 1626, 
the Earl of Strafford and Archbishop Laud in 1640, the Earl of Clarendon in 
 
 264.  See supra notes 196-218, and accompanying text. 
 265.  MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, GLASS HOUSES, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS AND 
THE POLITICS OF VENOM 21 (2018). 
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1667, and the Earl of Danby in 1678 are the most notable examples of this 
category of impeachments.  In the cases of Strafford, Laud, Clarendon, and 
Danby, Parliament explicitly alleged some variant of the charge against 
Danby that he “endeavored to subvert the ancient and well established form 
of government in this kingdom, and instead thereof to introduce and arbitrary 
and tyrannical way of government.”266  And as noted above, the 
impeachment of Warren Hastings was an effort to extend the traditional 
constitutional relationships between rulers and ruled in the home islands to 
the structure of the growing British Empire.267 
This use of impeachment is of paramount interest in the current moment 
of American history.  It establishes that, at least in British practice, the most 
important function of impeachment was removal or exemplary chastisement 
of officials whose behavior presented a threat to constitutional order.  In such 
cases, impeachment need not have been based on discrete incidents of 
violation of specified laws.  Rather, the essence of such cases was a 
continuing pattern of conduct in opposition to Parliament’s conception of 
proper constitutional arrangements.  To employ modern terminology, these 
impeachments were consciously undertaken either to restore or establish 
constitutional norms.  I will leave to the reader contemplation of whether 
reinvigoration of this conception of impeachment is timely. 
Conclusion 
In the end, impeachment is political, in both the small and large senses.  
That is, even when impeachment is sought to effect large constitutional ends, 
it will not occur unless the small politics of personal and party advantage 
produce the necessary votes.  In that regard, then-Congressman Gerald Ford 
was right when he famously declared that, in the United States, an 
impeachable offense “is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives 
considers [it] to be at a given moment in history.”268  Nonetheless, as I 
concluded some twenty years ago when writing about the Clinton 
impeachment, arguments about constitutional language and its antecedents 
matter because they have the effect of setting rough boundaries on the field 
on which the political battle is fought.269  If an impeachment battle is to be 
fought again soon, perhaps this discussion of the British antecedents of 
American impeachment will assist in setting those boundaries. 
 
 
 
 266.  See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text. 
 267.  See supra notes 198-221 and accompanying text. 
 268.  116 Cong. Rec. H3313-14 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford). 
 269.  Bowman, High Crimes and Misdemeanors, supra note 10, at 1564. 
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